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The United States Air Force officially adopted a military Safety Management System in
2013 to proactively prevent mishaps before they occurred. The military Aviation Safety
Action Program (ASAP) allows front-line operators the ability to utilize identity-free
processes to report safety concerns without fearing retribution. Historical statistics show
an average of 12 ASAP reports a week, or less than one percent of all Air Force Mobility
flights, were being filed by mobility operators. Personnel at the Air Mobility Command
safety center determined fewer concerns than desired were being reported and were
interested in understanding why operators chose not to report using ASAP.
It is possible for multiple factors to contribute positively or negatively toward
why an aircrew member would submit an ASAP report. A previous study by Steckel
(2014) identified several reasons why airline pilots might not report safety concerns;
however, no research exists to determine the same information within the military. The
purpose of this dissertation was to determine the extent to which four potential factors
influenced an operator’s intention to submit safety concerns using the military ASAP.
iv

While many factors have the ability to influence an individual’s decision-making, the
four primary factors of interest for this dissertation included: repercussion,
inconvenience, significance of event, and program value. The focus of this study
involved identifying which factors influenced an operator’s intentions to submit ASAP
reports by examining six relationship-based hypotheses.
The researcher conducted a survey of 376 mobility aircrew members (302
required) at Scott AFB, IL, to examine responses toward safety reporting. After
removing invalid responses, 332 samples were collected, cleaned, and analyzed.
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the measurement model while a
hypothetical structural model was used to test the six relationships.
The results indicated the factors program value and significance of event directly
affect an operator’s intent to submit an ASAP report, and positive correlations were
reported between the factor program value and the factors inconvenience and
significance of event. The data suggests that despite a lack of trust among uppermanagement, operators still report significant events even if they fear repercussion, often
simply omitting personal details. In addition, the data suggests the inconvenience of the
program is not enough to dissuade reporting safety concerns; operators primarily submit
safety concerns based on the magnitude of the event.
It is suggested for the Air Force to focus their attention on promoting the value of ASAP
and explaining the importance of reporting all magnitudes of events. It is believed that
by encouraging operators to report less-significant events while promoting the success of
the program, the Air Force will see an increase in ASAP reports.

v

DEDICATION
In 2015, while flying combat missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and northern
Africa, I had the opportunity to serve with some of the bravest military aviators on this
planet. In 2015, a C-130J crashed in Afghanistan, killing 11 crewmembers and
passengers. As I piloted the flag-draped coffins in my C-17A back to America, many
emotions flooded my head including the question, “Could someone have prevented this?”
In November of 2017, a T-38C from Laughlin AFB, TX, crashed in my back
yard. The pilot, Paul “Stuck” Barbour, was not only my squadron-mate, but also my dear
friend. I was one of the last individuals to personally see Stuck before he climbed into
his jet, and I was the last one he talked to on the radio before he died.
In November of 2018, another T-38C crashed at Laughlin AFB, TX. I performed
the initial investigation, searched the wreckage for hours, and was there to help John
“Trojan” Graziano into the hearse.
As I continuously write this dissertation, the number of USAF Class A military
mishaps continues to rise. This research is dedicated to all the brave aviators who have
lost their lives serving their country. I sincerely hope the findings of this research go on
to save lives and help promote safety in aviation worldwide.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. iv
Dedication ......................................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... xii
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. xiii
Chapter I

Introduction ................................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Problem ............................................................... 4
Purpose Statement .......................................................................... 5
Significance of the Study ............................................................... 5
Research Questions and Hypotheses ............................................. 6
Delimitations .................................................................................. 7
Limitations and Assumptions ........................................................ 9
Definitions of Terms .................................................................... 12
List of Acronyms ......................................................................... 13
Summary ...................................................................................... 14

Chapter II

Review of the Relevant Literature ........................................................... 16
Safety Culture Evolution.............................................................. 16
Benefits of Management of Culture ............................................. 18
Reduction of Risk ............................................................ 20
Culture and Climate with Respect to Accidents .......................... 21
Climate Vs. Culture ..................................................................... 21
vii

Predictive Nature ............................................................. 22
Culture in Society ........................................................................ 23
Safety Culture .............................................................................. 25
Just Culture .................................................................................. 26
Proactive Vs. Reactive Safety ...................................................... 29
Investigative Process.................................................................... 32
AIB / SIB ......................................................................... 33
NTSB ............................................................................... 33
Proactive Programs ...................................................................... 34
Military and Civil Differences ..................................................... 36
Role of the Unit Commander ........................................... 39
FAA Enforcement ............................................................ 41
Under Reporting........................................................................... 41
Safety Culture Effects .................................................................. 42
Perceived Repercussion ................................................... 43
Medium Convenience ...................................................... 44
Significance of Event ....................................................... 44
Program Value ................................................................. 45
Survey Use ................................................................................... 45
Theoretical Research Model ........................................................ 49
Summary ...................................................................................... 53
Chapter III

Research Methodology .......................................................................... 55
Research Approach ...................................................................... 56
viii

Research Design........................................................................... 57
Design and Procedures ..................................................... 57
Research Procedures .................................................................... 58
Population/Sample ....................................................................... 60
Data Collection Device ................................................................ 61
Ethical Issues ............................................................................... 62
Pretest........................................................................................... 63
Face Validity .................................................................... 64
SEM Assumptions ....................................................................... 64
Data Collection ............................................................................ 65
Treatment of the Data .................................................................. 65
Data Preparation and Missing Data ................................. 66
Outliers............................................................................. 66
Assumptions Testing and Transformation ....................... 67
Construct Validity ............................................................ 67
Convergent Validity ......................................................... 67
Discriminant Validity....................................................... 68
Instrument Reliability ...................................................... 68
Confirmatory Factor Analysis...................................................... 69
Summary ...................................................................................... 71
Chapter IV

Results ................................................................................................... 72
Pilot Study.................................................................................... 72
Demographics and Descriptive Statistics..................................... 75
ix

Descriptive Statistics .................................................................... 78
Measurement Model Assessment ................................................ 79
Validity Testing ........................................................................... 82
Reliability Testing ........................................................................ 85
Structural Model Testing (SEM) ................................................. 87
Hypothesis Testing....................................................................... 89
Alternate Theory .......................................................................... 91
Summary ...................................................................................... 92
Chapter V

Discussion, Conclusions, & Recommendations ..................................... 94
Discussion of the Results ............................................................. 95
Sample Characteristics ..................................................... 95
Hypothesis Results ....................................................................... 95
Conclusions ................................................................................ 100
Theoretical Contributions .......................................................... 101
Practical Implications................................................................. 102
Limitations ..................................................................... 103
Recommendations ...................................................................... 104
Future Research ......................................................................... 105

References ...................................................................................................................... 108
Appendices ..................................................................................................................... 118
A

ASAP Survey ........................................................................................ 118

B

Agreement to Participate ....................................................................... 122

C

Steckel ASAP Survey............................................................................ 124
x

D

ERAU IRB Approval Exempt Determination ...................................... 126

E

SME Biographies................................................................................... 128

xi

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1

Scale Indicators and Indicator Items .................................................................... 47

2

Proposed Factors and Items for Survey Use ........................................................ 62

3

Pilot Results .......................................................................................................... 73

4

Descriptive Statistics of Individual Questions ..................................................... 74

5

AMC MWS Representation ................................................................................. 76

6

AMC Base Location ............................................................................................. 77

7

Model Fit Indices for Initial and Final Measurement Model ............................... 82

8

AVE Measured Against the 5 Factors .................................................................. 84

9

Discriminate Validity Results .............................................................................. 84

10

Construct Reliability........................................................................................... 85

11

Model Fit Indices for Final Measurement Model .............................................. 86

12

Factor loadings of measurement model.............................................................. 86

13

Model Fit for Structural Model .......................................................................... 89

14

Structural Model Hypothesis Testing ................................................................. 90

xii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1

Restricted climb at Moses Lake ............................................................................. 2

2

Integration of safety climate and safety pyramid models..................................... 18

3

Steckel’s ASAP model fit test .............................................................................. 48

4

Steckel’s ASAP measurement model ................................................................... 49

5

Hypothetical structural model .............................................................................. 51

6

Research procedure .............................................................................................. 59

7

Initial Measurement model ................................................................................... 80

8

Final Measurement Model.................................................................................... 87

9

Standardized Path Coefficients for SEM.............................................................. 88

10

Alternate Theory Model ..................................................................................... 92

xiii

1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Air Force officially adopted the Air Force Safety Management System
(AFSMS) in 2013 (AFI 91-202, 2016; Ostrowski, Valha, & Ostrowki, 2014), yet Air
Force accident rates failed to decline. In 2015, a C-130J crashed in Afghanistan, killing
11 crewmembers (Air Force News Service, 2015); an F-16 experienced a midair
collision; and an additional F-16 crashed in Europe (NTSB, 2015; U.S. Air Forces in
Europe and Air Forces Africa, 2016). In 2016, the crashes continued: four F-16s crashed,
including an Air Force Thunderbird; two helicopters were destroyed in ground crashes; a
B-52 Bomber was destroyed; and a U-2 spy plane crashed (56 FW Public Affairs; Beale
Air Force Base Public Affairs, 2016; Gordon & Horton, 2016; HQ Pacific Air Forces
Public Affairs, 2016; Staff-ACC, 2016).
The amount of high-visibility crashes demonstrated an increase in Class-A
mishaps despite the active use of safety programs. The USAF defines a Class-A mishap
as a direct mishap cost totaling more than $2M; a fatality or permanent total disability;
destruction of a DoD aircraft; or permanent loss of primary mission capability of an AF
space vehicle (AFI91-204, 2018). Up to 2019, Air Force safety programs utilized tools
from the Air Force Safety Center and other safety divisions, including the Operations
Risk Assessment and Management System (OpsRAMS). OpsRAMS oversaw multiple
proactive safety programs, including the Military Aviation Safety Action Program
(MASAP/ASAP), the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), and the Military Flight
Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) data acquisition and analysis (AFI 91-202,
2016).
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Some programs saw immediate success: in 2012 Air Mobility Command (AMC)
was able to determine an unsafe procedure at Grand County airfield in Moses Lake,
Washington, with the use of MFOQA. The typical climb-out instructions at Grant
County forced large, C-17A aircraft to turn dangerously early while still low to the
ground. Figure 1 shows the typical climb-out flight path for a C-17A at Grant County
International. Through the data acquisition process (MFOQA), personnel at OpsRAMS
were able to change the procedure to mitigate the discovered hazard (Clark, 2014).

Figure 1. Restricted climb at Moses Lake. MFOQA data illustrated a dangerous
procedure for C-17 aircraft as shown by the red track (Permission granted from Clark,
2014).

MFOQA was not the only proactive program to show initial success; the LOSA
operation successfully identified pilot trends otherwise unable to be discovered. In one
particular LOSA report, OpsRAMS discovered overall safety trends of an entire
community, including checklist discipline and oceanic procedures (Grosz, 2016).
Following the discoveries, AMC instituted specific training and special interest items to
mitigate the discovered hazards. Unfortunately, LOSA and MFOQA take significant
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amounts of time and resources to discover safety-related problems. In comparison,
ASAP generates immediate data-points from operators experiencing safety-related
concerns.
Because all ASAP reports are addressed by Safety offices at the Major Command
level, reports often trigger quick fixes to safety concerns. In a 2014 ASAP report, a set of
taxiway lines in Turkey were reported by aircrews to appear insufficiently close to
barriers. The lines forced large aircraft to be closer than desired to ground objects
rendering a potentially unsafe situation. After review, the taxiway lines were discovered
to have been originally measured incorrectly, requiring an immediate new paint job to
mitigate potential future mishaps (Grosz, 2016).
OpsRAMS has experienced considerable benefits from their three proactive safety
programs. However, ASAP was the only program that examined real-time concerns and
elevated them to higher-authorities directly from the operators. While LOSA and
MFOQA were managed and completed by safety personnel, the success of ASAP relied
on the submission of voluntary reports from aircrews—information OpsRAMS would
likely not discover otherwise. Personnel from AMC Safety and OpsRAMS were worried
under-reporting of safety concerns existed for multiple reasons (T. Grosz, personal
communication, 15 September 2016).
In a preliminary safety study conducted by AMC headquarters in 2016, the
personnel in OpsRAMS discovered under-reporting exists, especially within ASAP (T.
Grosz, personal communication, 17 October 2016). Due to fear of retribution,
inconvenience of submission, and other factors, responses from a preliminary AMC
safety survey suggested multiple reasons could lead to mobility aircrews not submitting
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safety reports. ASAP was developed as a USAF-sanctioned reporting system designed to
eliminate fear of reprisal while gathering safety information (AFI-91-225, 2015; Grosz,
2014). However, based on previous ASAP tracking, personnel at OpsRAMS were
receiving less than two ASAP reports per day (OpsRAMS, 2016). The forecasted target
number desired was 300 reports per month, or roughly 10 reports per day (T. Grosz,
personal communication, 9 July 2017). Personnel at OpsRAMS had interest in seeing
100% contact information provided when the reports were submitted (T. Grosz, personal
communication, 9 July 2017). Due to fear of retribution, inconvenience of submission,
and other factors, the preliminary AMC safety survey suggested multiple reasons could
lead to mobility aircrews not submitting safety reports.
Statement of the Problem
The U.S. Air Force successfully implemented a military SMS with a high
emphasis on proactive safety (AFI 91-202, 2016). The ASAP, LOSA, and MFOQA
programs proactively attempt to prevent accidents before they potentially occur (AFI 91225, 2015). However, the success of aviation safety, including OpsRAMS programs,
rests in a positive safety culture through all levels of management, including general
officers, flying commanders, and pilots (Dekker, 2012). ASAP was the only program
that relied on direct and voluntary communication straight from the operators (AFI 91225, 2015). ASAP reports provide up-to-date feedback about safety-related problems to
top-level leadership (AFI 91-225, 2015). With over 300 AMC sorties being flown a day,
an average rate of approximately 12 safety reports a week indicated less than one percent
of all AMC flights were associated with reported safety concerns. Personnel at
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OpsRAMS were interested in understanding why operators chose not to report safety
concerns.
Purpose Statement
OpsRAMS programs demonstrated some success with their three safety
programs; however, safety can always evolve and improve. Using ASAP, OpsRAMS
received fewer aircrew reports than desired, with their target goal closer to the rates of the
major US airlines. It was possible for multiple factors to contribute either positively or
negatively toward why aircrew members chose to submit an ASAP report or not.
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if four potential factors affected
an operator’s intent to submit an ASAP report. The four factors of the study were
repercussion, inconvenience, significance of an event, and perceived program value. The
researcher utilized a survey to extract answers from operators regarding their personal
influences to submitting safety concerns using ASAP. With valid data, the researcher
could provide realistic answers to OpsRAMS regarding relationships between the factors
and why operators may not be submitting safety reports.
Significance of the Study
In 2014, Steckel published a dissertation regarding the perceptions toward ASAP
in the commercial airline industry. His literature review discussed how “pilots have
always been wary of reporting their errors or the errors of others in order to improve
safety” (2014, p. 1). According to Mr. Tim Grosz, head of OpsRAMS, the AMC safety
department desired more ASAP reports from all AMC aircrews (T. Grosz, personal
communication, 9 July 2017). After determining how each factor affected operator’s
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decisions to report safety concerns, OpsRAMS could better target how to advertise their
program to theoretically increase reporting.
The practical contributions to this study could yield a higher ASAP rate, which
could subsequently potentially lower accident rates. Numerous levels in an organization
benefit from an increase in safety reports. At the bottom level, operators who
continuously report concerns have demonstrated buy-in of the program and are assumed
to have a basic level of trust with the organization. Through demonstrated actions,
operators who see their concerns being addressed are likely to continue to report safety
concerns. At the top-levels of safety, additional reports most-likely bring otherwise
unknown hazards to light. The ability to collect otherwise unknown parts of knowledge
and be able to act upon discovered hazards is the entire purpose of such a program. In
addition, top levels of management will hopefully see true benefits through the reduction
of aviation mishaps leading to cost savings, increase in operational efficiency, and of
course, the reduction in loss of life.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In order to provide tailored hypotheses, specific research questions were developed
based on the problem statements and purpose.


Research Question 1: Which of the four identified factors influence operator’s
intentions on submitting ASAP reports?



Research Question 2: How do the four identified factors affect operator’s
intentions on submitting ASAP reports?
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The hypotheses were developed based on literature review and discussions with
OpsRAMS.


H1: Perceived repercussion is positively related to operators submitting ASAP
reports.



H2: Inconvenience is positively related to operators submitting ASAP reports.



H3: The significance of an event is positively related to operators submitting
ASAP reports.



H4: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to operators
submitting ASAP reports.



H5: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to
significance of event.



H6. The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to
inconvenience.

Delimitations
This dissertation presented the analyzation of AMC operators’ intentions about
their use of ASAP using surveys to gather data at advanced training courses. From Jan
1st through July 31st, 2016, there were 383 ASAP reports filed through AMC. Of those
reports, 48 were filed by non-pilot personnel (OpsRAMS Newsletter, 2016). These
submissions demonstrated non-pilot aircrew positions were submitting ASAP reports and
contributing to preventative safety. The study was aimed to include loadmasters,
engineers, navigators, and maintenance personnel taking part in the formal training
course, in addition to the majority of the population, pilots. While multiple operator
types attended the training and provided valuable information, it is unknown if the
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proportion of non-pilots to pilots who participated in the survey was representative of the
actual AMC population.
Due to national security reasons, the Department of Defense (DoD) tightly
controls all official surveys. Any official survey being presented to any part of the DoD
must attain Pentagon approval and can take over a year for the process to
complete. Regulations prohibit individuals or organizations from simply sending survey
links to an entire squadron, base, or Major Command. Due to information-confidentiality
laws, it is not permissible for organizations to use official, government-contact
information to solicit information. Researchers can keep the sample local if it pertains to
a particular formal training course. This research relied on a convenience sampling
technique that surveyed all AMC operators enrolled in advanced training at AMC
headquarters, Scott AFB, IL. The course ran approximately once every five weeks,
instructing approximately 20-40 candidates from all AMC airframes and locations. It
was the desire of OpsRAMS to specifically sample just the training population as a
means to evaluate if safety considerations were being instructed and/or discussed out in
the mobility environment.
The significance of an event may be linked to whether an individual feels a safety
report is warranted or not. It may be difficult to ultimately quantify an event’s
significance, due to the fact that multiple operators may think of the same event in
different ways; while one operator may feel the event is insignificant, another may feel
the same incident is worthy of being reported.
This research specifically examined four major factors and two additional
relationships among those factors. There are an unknown number of additional factors
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that could influence an operators’ decision to report safety concerns; however, this study
only focused on what was considered the four major factors.
Limitations and Assumptions
Not all AMC operators had the opportunity to participate in the survey due to the
desire of OpsRAMS to specifically survey only those participating in advanced training.
However, the assumption accepted by both the researcher and OpsRAMS was the data
collected from the convenience sample was representative of a majority of the Active
Duty AMC population. Of the Active Duty bases, 100% of the bases were represented,
and all mobility airframes were represented within a reasonable percentage. The
National Guard and Reserve bases were not adequately represented—this is most likely
due to the general non-continuous training Reserve and Guard pilots send their upgrading
pilots to. The data will most likely be most accurate toward Active Duty pilots and may
not represent the Guard or Reserves. Air Mobility Command provided unclassified pilot
distribution percentages. There were only small differences between Active Duty major
airframes and were not considered significant for this study. However, the National
Guard and Reserves saw a significant lack of representation for this study in the C-130
and KC-135 communities for unknown reasons.
It is assumed that the individuals participating in the survey have been flying with
a more experienced corps of aviators—the operators attending the AMC training had
been working closely with instructors and evaluators for over two years, and thus have at
least heard and considered the opinions, policies, and procedures of those who have been
instructing the upgrading population. However, this specific sample group could affect
the results due to the nature of taking essentially the “average” pilot. By selecting this
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group of aviators, the researcher made strong assumptions that the teachings of
experienced aviators were passed to the younger, upgrading pilots, who had been flying
in the mobility world for more than two years. Even though these operators may not
have 10+ years of experience, it is assumed the instruction of how to use ASAP and why
to use the system was passed on. The results are generalized and cannot truly speak to
the opinions of the entire command.
In regard to the structural model, it is assumed the specification of the model
relied on the researcher’s good judgement; wherein, the researcher 1) avoided the
omission of correlated causes; 2) correctly partitioned the variables; 3) accurately laid out
direct and indirect effects; and 4) properly conveyed the error covariance structure
(Kline, 2015).
There are four main influencing variables this study targeted for research. While
there are multiple additional reasons for which an individual may or may not submit an
ASAP report, this study assumed those additional factors were not as influential on the
entire population as the four being presented for study. Fear of reprisal is a large part of
under-reporting (Pransky, Snyder, Allard, & Himmelstein, 1999). Frazier (2013)
believes operators fear retribution not only to themselves, but to their fellow employees
for supplying information to management. Inconvenience can also affect reporting
rates—it was hypothesized by Gilbey, Tani, and Tsui that the inconvenience of
completing the safety report itself contributes to a lack of safety reporting (2015). When
operators are unable to immediately report due to task prioritization, long wait times, or
even simple memory-loss over time, the likelihood of a report being filed diminishes
(Gilbey et al., 2015). Higher reporting can be associated with a positive perceived value.
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In a study by Griffin and Neal, perceptions of knowledge about safety directly influenced
safety participation (2000). Those who positively identify perceived value in a safety
system positively contribute to reporting (Freiwald, 2013). In addition, the magnitude of
an event will contribute to safety reporting. Gilbey et al. (2015) suggested if operators
feel the event was small or harmless, the event is not worth reporting. These four factors
were considered the most prevalent reasons for influencing reporting; however, it was
acknowledged that other factors could contribute, albeit not in a major capacity.
The data was complete and continuous, with no outliers or missing inputs
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). In regard to survey participants, it was assumed all
individuals were competent, of sound nature, could read and write, were familiar with the
terms being presented, and provided honest, accurate answers. The researcher assumed
the individuals sufficiently completed all required safety training as provided by specific
aircraft syllabi to include ASAP and the reporting process. The researcher assumed all
operators operate with a safety-mindset, and do not wish ill-regard on the operation. For
the purposes of this study, the safety mindset of an individual is that he or she simply
desires to communicate hazardous information, if discovered.
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Definitions of Terms
Culture

A sociological view of the shared stock of
knowledge, values, and symbols in a social entity
(Pfaff, Hammer, Ernstmann, Kowalski, & Ommen,
2009).

Just culture

An environment where front-line operators are not
punished for actions, omissions, or decisions made
commensurate with experience and training, and
where gross negligence, willful disregard, and
destructive acts are not tolerated (Oliber, 2015).

Proactive safety

An attempt to prevent accidents and incidents
before they occur (Welborn & Boraiko, 2009).

Q-1

The aircrew member demonstrated desired
performance and knowledge of procedures,
equipment, and directives within tolerances
specified in the grading criteria (AFI11-202V2,
2010).

Q-2

The aircrew member demonstrated the ability to
perform duties safely, but there were one or more
area(s)/sub-area(s) where additional training was
assigned or a non-critical area/subarea grade of U
(unsatisfactory) was awarded (AFI11-202V2,
2010).
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Q-3

The aircrew member demonstrated an unacceptable
level of safety, performance, or knowledge (AFI11202V2, 2010).

Safety culture

The attitude, beliefs, perceptions, and values that
employees share in relation to safety in the
workplace (DeMaria, 2017).

List of Acronyms
AC

Advisory Circular

AFI

Air Force Instruction

AFSMS

Air Force Safety Management System

AIB

Accident Investigation Board

AMC

Air Mobility Command

ASAP

Aviation Safety Action Program

ASRS

Aviation Safety Reporting System

AVE

Average Variance Estimated

CFA

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

DoD

Department of Defense

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FMEA

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

FOQA

Flight Operations Quality Analysis

GFI

Goodness of Fit Index

GOF

Goodness of Fit
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GRACC

Global Reach Aircraft Commander’s Course

ICAO

International Civil Aeronautical Organization

LOSA

Line Observation Safety Audit

MFOQA

Military Flight Operations Quality Analysis

NTSB

National Transportation and Safety Board

NZCAA

New Zealand Civil Aviation Administration

OpsRAMS

Operations Risk Assessment and Management System

ORM

Operational Risk Management

OSHA

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

RMSEA

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation

SEM

Structural Equation Modeling

SIB

Safety Investigation Board

SMS

Safety Management System

Summary
The U.S Air Force successfully implemented a safety management system and
utilized three key, proactive programs: ASAP, LOSA, and MFOQA. Each of the
programs demonstrated positive safety improvements across Air Mobility Command;
however, the personnel at OpsRAMS believed safety reports were being under-reported.
The ASAP program only received roughly two reports a day, with target goals closer to
10—numbers that would more closely match the U.S. airline’s civilian ASAP submission
rate. OpsRAMS personnel desired to know if the potential key factors: repercussion,
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inconvenience, significance of an event, and program value affected an individual’s
decision to report a safety concern.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The review of relevant literature in this chapter outlines the trends of safety
culture throughout aviation and culminates with the positive correlation between a
positive safety culture and voluntary reporting. Safety programs were often a relatively
reactive process, therein waiting for safety concerns to arise before making necessary
adjustments (Brady, 2000). In 1908, Orville Wright crashed an aircraft in Virginia, and
the first safety report was created. The investigating personnel reactively explained why
Orville thought the aircraft crashed and created potential remedies for the situation
(Brady, 2000). The U.S. government recognized an increase in hazards existed with
increased air traffic in the 1950s, and utilized preventative safety with the creation of
federal airways and air traffic procedures (Brady, 2000). In the 1970s, the FAA began
the ASAP program as a truly preventative program (FAA, 2017). Today, safety reporting
is a prime example of preventative safety and how organizations can gather safety
information to help prevent an accident before an occurrence (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford,
2008).
Safety Culture Evolution
Safety culture is prevalent in multiple industries and is shared among
organizations. As an example, “many safety initiatives have been transferred
successfully from commercial aviation to health care” (Lewis, 2011, p. 4). One initiative
used by multiple industries is incentivized reporting; with no-fault reporting, by
submitting safety information to the FAA, pilots have proof of a constructive safety
attitude (Lewis, 2011). Despite variations between definitions and measurement scales,
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commonality exists “allowing identification of core conceptual themes and shared
measurement subscales” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517). “It is due to such convergence that
recent meta-analytic studies revealed that safety climate offers robust prediction of
objective and subjective safety criteria across industry and countries” (Zohar, 2010, p.
1517). “These studies attest to the strength of relationship between safety climate and
safety criteria” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517). One such safety model is the safety pyramid; it is
designed to identify latent factors that increase the likelihood of incidents/accidents
through the advertisement of unsafe working conditions. According to Zohar (2010), the
meta-analytic data suggests safety climate perceptions predict safety behaviors; the
arrows on the safety pyramid suggest potential effects of safety climate on
accident/incident factors.
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Figure 2. Integration of safety climate and safety pyramid models (Zohar, 2010).
Printed with permission from Elsevier.

This is the integration of safety climate and safety pyramid models. Given the
availability of well-developed procedures for safety climate measurement, the analysis of
latent pathogens allows comparison between departments of an organization and between
organizations of the same industry.
Benefits of Management of Culture
Controlling or managing a culture can help an organization move toward a
particular mindset. In a study conducted by Hajmohammad and Vachon:
Results suggested that organizations with a positive [safety culture], where
(i) top management is concerned about employees’ safety and well-being
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and (ii) employees are empowered and actively involve and participate in
safety-related activities, are more likely to gain better financial,
environmental, and safety outcomes as a result of their increased
employees’ commitment in pursuing organization goals and objectives.
(2014, p. 273)
They further expand, suggesting that commitment to “safety and
establishing a positive [safety culture] as the starting point toward achieving a
sustainable business can yield great benefits not only in terms of improved safety
performance, but also with regards to improvements in a firm’s environmental
and financial outcomes” (Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2014, p. 274). By 2006,
safety culture was also shown to affect organizational commitment, job
satisfaction, and intentions to stay at the current organization (Clark, 2006).
In a meta-analysis study, Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke suggest that both
the person and the situation are important factors related to workplace safety; “Workers
can be selected, trained, and supported through positive safety climate to maximize safety
motivation and safety knowledge, which in turn leads to safe behaviors and fewer
accidents and injuries” (2009, p. 1273). Understanding the culture and climate of an
organization is important in order to make a positive change. It is important for
organizations to recognize they can benefit from creating a stronger safety culture and a
more accurate reporting climate (Probst, 2008). One snapshot of a culture, often
considered climate, can be found using surveys.
Surveys of employees have generated many possible explanations for
underreporting, including demographic characteristics, such as age and organizational
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tenure; perceived lack of management responsiveness; fear of reprisals or loss of
workplace perks and pay incentives; and an acceptance that injuries are a fact of life in
certain lines of work (Probst, 2008). Probst (2008) confirmed two hypotheses: that
organizational safety climate is related to the rate of experienced employee injuries, such
that a more positive climate is related to a lower injury rate; and that organizations with a
poor safety climate underreport injuries to a greater extent than organizations with a
positive safety climate. Probst (2008) discovered the existence of underreporting itself
was not a new finding necessarily, but that certain organizations with a poor safety
climate might be more likely than others to experience underreporting.
Safety culture as a method to influence the reduction of risk and prevention
of accidents. Zohar (2010) specifically argues a strong safety climate leads to an
increase in safety performance, thus reducing the amount of accidents. One indication of
the prevention of accidents is the safety performance of an organization (Zohar, 2010).
Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia (2008) argue one of the primary steps in establishing a
safety culture is to assess the current culture. When considering management as part of
culture, Coyle, Sleeman, and Adams argue the measurement of “precursors of accidents
identified in a safety climate analysis provides a powerful proactive management tool”
(Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995, p. 247). Note: safety performance may be used to
refer to two different concepts: an organizational metric for safety outcomes, such as
number of injuries per year; or a metric for safety-related behaviors of
individuals (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009).
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Culture and Climate with Respect to Accidents
Safety climate refers to employees’ perceptions of the degree to which
management rewards, supports, and expects safe practices. Organizations that have a
positive safety climate experience fewer accidents and injuries than those with a negative
safety climate (Allen, Barren, & Scott, 2010).
It is argued “safety knowledge and safety motivation were most strongly related
to safety performance behaviors, closely followed by psychological safety climate and
group safety climate. With regard to accidents and injuries, however, group safety
climate had the strongest association” (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009, p.
1103). Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke analyzed Clarke’s 2006 meta-analysis
where “safety climate is a meaningful predictor of safety performance behaviors
(particularly safety participation) and is weakly related to accidents” (2009, p. 1103).
Another crucial aspect regarding the development of safety climate is the
correction of organizational errors through error reporting. Employees may perceive
reporting errors (or unsafe conditions, for example) as risky, which may increase their
reluctance to report (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Probst (2008) found that organizations with
a more positive safety climate appear to have less underreporting of errors (Allen, Barren,
& Scott, 2010).
Climate Vs. Culture
A key difference exists between climate and culture. Safety culture is a product
of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of
behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an
organization’s health and safety management (Sexton et al., 2006). Climate, however, is

22
“a summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their work environments …
a frame of reference for guiding appropriate and adaptive task behaviors” (Zohar, 1980,
p. 96), and is considered a subset of organizational climate (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams,
1995).
In another explanation, “organizational climate is made up of shared perceptions
among employees concerning the procedures, practices and kinds of behaviors that get
rewarded and supported with regard to a specific strategic focus” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517).
One of the key attributes for organizational climate is the analyzation of employee
perceptions of certain aspects of their organizational environment (Zohar, 2010).
Employee surveys are designed to discover what behaviors get supported and rewarded
and ought to relate to the nature of relationships between rather than isolation of policies,
procedures, and practices (Zohar, 2010).
Predictive Nature to Measure Climate / Culture. “For safety climate to be
assessed and improved it must first be measured – a methodological approach which is
well established in high-risk industries such as aviation, the nuclear energy and petrochemical sectors” (de Wet, Johnson, Mash, & McConnachie, 2010, p. 135). Clarke
(2006) argues the influence of safety climate actually varies across occupational settings.
Regardless, safety climate assessment typically requires the workforce to complete
questionnaires anonymously on a periodic basis (de Wet et al., 2010). “When the
strategic focus involves performance of high-risk operations, the resultant shared
perceptions define safety climate” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517). Safety climate perceptions
should focus on the nature of relationships between safety policies, procedures, and
practices (Zohar, 2010). Christian et al. (2009) break down safety climate into
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psychological (individual) safety and group safety climate. When individual perceptions
are shared, a group-level climate emerges.
Zohar’s 1980 study suggested safety climate appeared to be directly related to the
safety record of an organization and argued the perceived climate of an organization will
identify areas for improvement (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995). “Organizational
climate, when operationalized and validated, may be a useful tool in understanding
occupational behavior” (Zohar, 1980, p. 96). The two biggest factors in determining the
level of safety climate were worker’s perceptions of management attitudes about safety
and the perceptions about the relevance of safety in general processes (Zohar, 1980).
Culture in Society
The idea of an established and measured culture was analyzed in a current context
when Raymond Williams referred to culture in 1977 as “a general process of inner
development” (Grossberg, 2013, p. 457). Today, the meaning and definition of culture
varies wildly between industries and organizations. Many consider safety culture a subfacet of organizational culture, a concept used to describe shared values that affect and
influence member’s attitudes and behaviors compared to the organization’s health
(Cooper, 2000). The definition of culture is admittedly broad by the Bloomsbury
Dictionary of English Literature (1997) but is best used in safety context as: “a
sociological view of the shared stock of knowledge, values, and symbols in a social
entity” (Pfaff, Hammer, Ernstmann, Kowalski, & Ommen, 2009, p. 493).
It is important to note the very concept of culture is not a stable definition; an
individual may perceive culture, race, and ethnicity all as the same entity (Monk,
Winslade, & Sinclair, 2008). In literature, there exists no universal agreement on the
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definition of the word culture, but for the purposes of this dissertation, culture signifies
the sum of the patterned behaviors that makes up how an organization interacts with
society (Monk, Winslade, & Sinclair, 2008).
If culture is considered a way of life, a community’s culture, therefore, provides
the position and standard for judging all social change (Grosberg, 2013). The ability to
compare and contrast cultural norms slowly forms a difficult problem for those effecting
change. Because comparisons of culture can range on a scale from global proportions to
small entities, it is difficult to mold or adjust a culture without enduring unintended
pushback (Ojalehto & Medin, 2015). However, according to Danisman’s research
regarding culture and organizations, most institutions are hesitant to adopt a change into a
program (2008). It is likely that managerial decisions will be difficult to implement, due
to societal-based patterns of understanding, depending on the current culture of the
organization (Danisman, 2008). Johansson, Astrom, Kauffeldt, Helldin, and Carlstrom
(2014) argue conservative, organizational culture has the potential to hinder the
implementation of new organizational models. In their study of nurses overcoming
culture shift, Johansson et al. (2014) discovered the dominating culture of their ward
included cohesion, belongingness, and trust, but also included a tendency to avoid
alternative ideas and perspectives. Not all individuals, groups, or organizations will
respond to change in the same manner; beliefs, values, and attitudes can vary
tremendously (Cooper, 2000). Even though an organization may possess a dominating
‘safety culture’, the perception between sites, elements, offices, or divisions could be
completely different (Cooper, 2000). Therefore, before an organization attempts to

25
change a specific perception, it is essential to understand the challenges that will be faced
when attempting to institute a culture change.
Safety Culture
Safety culture has been an evolving tool for organizations to improve the overall
practice of safety in the workplace. “Safety culture is a sub-facet of organizational
culture, which is thought to affect members’ attitudes and behavior in relation to an
organization’s ongoing health and safety performance” (Cooper, 2000, p. 111).
Industries, including offshore, nuclear, and shipping, have all expressed interest in the
concept of a safety culture as a means of reducing the potential for mitigating large-scale
disasters (Cooper, 2000). Excluding workplace regulations implemented by agencies
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), proactive safety
programs can be used to influence safety culture. While safety culture has been
historically discussed as a required entity, the real need for a robust safety culture was
magnified with the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 (Solomon, 2015). The investigation
into Chernobyl cited a lack of a positive safety culture as a key cause for the disaster,
highlighting a need for enterprises around the world to reconsider their approach to safety
(Solomon, 2015).
Consumers and governments demand accident-free industries, and the
implementation of a strong safety program helps organizations progress toward a positive
safety culture (Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains, Lacken, & Nuha, 2010). It is generally
accepted that a safety culture must be continuously monitored and improved to avoid
significant incidents (Warszawska & Kraslawski, 2016). The responsibility of a safety
culture does not rely on the safety office but must be fully committed to and instituted by
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the administration (DeLaHunt, 2012). Aviation is not the only community concerned
with safety culture; medical, manufacturing, oil, and construction are all examples of
industries extremely interested in positive safety cultures.
In a positive safety culture, team members are encouraged to take responsibility
and bring safety concerns to management’s attention (Solomon, 2016). On the opposite
side, a negative culture attempts to blame individuals or even conceal known incidents
(Solomon, 2016). One of the greatest tools a management team can utilize to measure
the health of their safety culture is a safety perception survey (Frazer, 2013). While there
are numerous instruments, most surveys include a series of questions or statements
designed to measure an individual’s perceptions of the safety culture of their organization
(Cooper, 2000). Often, the information provided by a survey can help provide insights
into why individuals may not be submitting safety concerns; surveys can also provide
valuable information about the perception of safety within the organization (Frazer,
2013).
In the chemical industry, safety engineers believe safety cultures “result from the
actions of each individual making slight adjustments, providing reminders to their peers,
and by working with colleagues” (Wood-Black, 2004, p. 29). While formal policy,
procedures, and audits are all necessary to officially maintain a safety management
system, the safety culture of an organization is established with buy-in from every level
of the organization from management to operators (Dekker, 2012).
Just Culture
Just culture—as defined in the aviation environment—is a culture where frontline operators are not punished for actions, omissions, or decisions made commensurate
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with experience and training, and where gross negligence, willful disregard, and
destructive acts are not tolerated (Oliber, 2015). A just culture provides an atmosphere
where employees are encouraged to report their mistakes without fear of retribution from
an organization’s leadership. However, a just culture does not allow unacceptable
behavior to be tolerated. Because every mistake is different, it is necessary for
management to draw a line between accepting mistakes and tolerating unacceptable
behavior (Oliber, 2015).
A strong safety culture is the culmination of multiple sub-cultures, each with
independent tasks and overarching requirements (Cooper, 2000). Cooper (2000) argues a
just culture is actually the sub-byproduct of a strong reporting culture, where just culture
is part of the building blocks that make up a reporting culture. Cooper equates a safety
culture to the similarities of an informed culture and characterizes the reporting culture as
a dependent state to the informed culture itself. Essentially, the base for a strong just
culture must lie with the strong foundation of an overarching safety culture (Cooper,
2000).
The idea of a just culture requires not only a call to the attention of a matter at
hand; a just culture must provide the ability to both satisfy demands for accountability
while simultaneously contributing to the learning environment (Dekker & Breakey,
2016). However, a balance must exist between wanting all information in the open while
not tolerating all actions (Dekker, 2014). In a just culture, it is important to ask: ‘what is
responsible for things going wrong?’ rather than trying to find a culprit or determine who
is responsible (Dekker, 2011).
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Even with a just culture officially enacted, employees may still be hesitant to
report concerns. Employees fail to report hazardous situations for multiple reasons.
Sometimes the employees are unaware of the potential consequences; some fear the
retribution they or others will receive for their information (Frazer, 2013). An additional
reason can be lack of acknowledgement—an employee may be hesitant to provide new
information if a previous report was submitted without any feedback (note: military
ASAPs have the option of including personal information for follow-up). This situation
leads individuals to believe management does not care about safety. Other times,
employees may simply believe the program is ineffective due to scale, managerial
concerns, budget, or other constraints (Frazer, 2013), thus the program has no value.
One of the most difficult challenges with implementing a just culture is stepping
away from the cultural norm where managers seek to find an individual at fault. Dekker
(2012) suggests it is human nature to find a scapegoat to shed the blame away from an
individual and away from the true cause in order to save face of an organization or
individual. However, if the blame is shifted away from the true cause, the organization
can suffer significantly in terms of willingness and desire to report safety incidents on the
part of employees; employees will not feel protected, will not report their safety
concerns, and will not keep the lines of communication open. The direct result is an
organization that fails to acknowledge potential safety pitfalls within its own walls.
Dekker (2012) suggests a specific life-cycle exists for a successful safety culture:
report, disclose, protect, and learn. Convincing individuals to report are often the
difference in a successful safety culture and one that is not. Many professional groups,
such as fire fighters, police, pilots, technicians, nurses, and air traffic controllers have
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developed deep-rooted cultures that require members to remain silent when a problem
arises (Dekker, 2012). It is common for the members of such groups to stay unified and
will often refuse to speak, thus protecting the individuals from retribution.
Unfortunately, safety issues continue to be prevalent when information is not shared, and
individuals who discover problems find themselves in situations where they either report
mistakes and risk reprimand or hide the mistake and hope the entire crew remains silent.
In Dekker’s just culture life cycle, it is imperative for individuals to report safety
concerns. The true balance of the system therefore lies within management; what actions
should the organization take when an employee notifies management of a mistake?
Management has ultimate responsibility to determine acceptable levels of error
commensurate with experience and training. Once employees recognize management has
an interest in protecting individuals, the organization can move forward with a more
balanced approach to safety.
Proactive Vs. Reactive Safety
Historically, aviation safety was an extremely reactionary process. In the early
1900s, aviation was gathering significant attention, often with increased negative public
perceptions of aircraft incidents and accidents (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). The
increased awareness led Congress to pass the Air Commerce Act of 1926, authorizing the
Secretary of Air Commerce to “investigate, record, and make public the cause of
accidents in civil air navigation” (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008, p. 43). As aviation
advanced, multiple, additional state departments were formed, eventually leading to the
development of the NTSB in 1966 (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). While accident
investigations and reporting were critical processes necessary to determine the causes of
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an incident, they remained reactive procedures performed after the occurrence (Welborn
& Boraiko, 2009).
By 1975, the NTSB concluded a new approach to safety was required after the
crash of TWA 514 (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Investigators of the crash
discovered that “pilots were extremely wary of submitting any report that could
potentially be used against them or their colleagues” (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008, p.
46), and began the process of anonymous reporting with a neutral, trusted broker as the
receiver of information: NASA.
The ability to quantify a proactive safety program is quite different from reactive
safety. It can be difficult to prove a proactive safety system is truly the reason a
hypothetical accident did not occur, thus making it difficult to say a proactive program
saved a specific amount of assets or lives. The proactive procedures in a safety process
attempt to prevent accidents and incidents before they occur but use inferential analysis
to describe a potential reality that is not yet manifest (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).
Nevertheless, a truly effective safety process will have both fully functional proactive and
reactive elements (Welborn & Boraiko, 2009).
With reactive safety, investigations sometimes focus on time-sensitive evidence—
a specific team gathers and analyzes evidence to determine a root cause. Proactive safety,
however, often relies on models and programs to ensure success and is used daily by both
leadership and front-line operators (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford, 2008). On a daily basis,
operational risk management (ORM) is used to calculate the perceived risk against
mission requirements. Elements such as weather, human factors, type of mission, and
mission requirements all help quantify the potential risk for the flight. The FAA (AC
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120-51E) suggests pilots use the IM SAFE acronym prior to flight, reminding pilots to
check for illness, medications, stress, alcohol, fatigue, and emotional state (2004a). Both
the ORM process and IM SAFE test are examples of preventative measures to analyze
risk. In addition to daily risk-management tools, many organizations adopt advanced and
more complicated, preventative safety programs. Aviation programs such as the Aviation
Safety Action Program (ASAP), Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), and Flight
Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) gather trend data directly from the operators to
examine potential problems.
When combined, the elements of the proactive and reactive safety process form a
safety management system (SMS). SMS is a system designed to prevent accidents
through an effective management of safety risk (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford, 2008). The
program is designed to minimize risk based on four safety components:
1. Safety policy
2. Safety risk management
3. Safety assurance
4. Safety promotion
The promotion of safety is characterized by the safety values, attitudes, and behaviors of
the management and front-line operators within the organization (ICAO, 2013). As
organizations look to fully implement a working SMS, it is necessary to have all four
components of the system functioning efficiently. The safety culture of an organization
directly contributes to the overall safety performance of an organization and can lead to
the success or failure of the SMS.
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Investigative Process
Despite the progress of proactive safety programs, including SMS, aircraft
accidents still drive a need to look at safety retrospectively through the results of
accident/incident investigations. The investigative process is a formal evaluation
designed to identify accident causal factors and opportunities for an organization to
improve its safety management system.
It is important to understand accidents do not simply happen—they are caused
(Oakley, 2012). An investigation is more than simply digging for answers—it is a
structured process that attempts to identify a full sequence of events to determine causal
factors (Oakley, 2012). Investigations are typically considered a reactive process because
they are initiated after an accident occurs. However, an investigation can still be
considered a proactive process, as the practice is not complete until corrective actions or
recommendations are published (Arnaldo Valdes & Gomez Comendador, 2011). While
the ultimate goal is to determine the source of failure, investigators need to determine an
accident sequence through unbiased evidence-gathering to communicate acquired
knowledge (Lindberg, Hansson, & Rollenhagen, 2010), even if it means human errors
were/are the causal factors.
Despite active safety management plans, public perception of the risk of aircraft
accidents and crises continues to grow (Roed-Larson & Stoop, 2012). Accident
investigations continue to be a reactive measurement of safety management systems, but
still provide valuable identification of future hazards. Investigations can often require
significant resources with finances, personnel, equipment, and more. However,
investigations remain a crucial part of any safety organization. Through the active
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process of determining root causes and recommendations, the investigative process will
continue to act as a proactive safety measure.
AIB / SIB. After a military aviation accident, two investigations simultaneously
take place. One is performed by an accident investigation board (AIB) and the other by a
safety investigation board (SIB). According to Air Force Instruction 91-204, Safety
Investigations and Reports, “safety investigations and reports are conducted and written
solely to prevent future mishaps” (2014, p. 7). Accident investigation boards, however,
“inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding mishaps as well as to obtain and
preserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, adverse
administrative action, and for public disclosure in accordance with DoD 5400.7R
Freedom of Information Act” (2014, 7). Safety investigations take priority over any
accident investigation board unless criminal activity or suicide is suspected.
NTSB. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates accidents
and incidents to determine as expeditiously as possible what caused the accident to
prevent a similar occurrence. The NTSB is an independent government federal agency
charged with improving safety of the United States’ transportation system. The NTSB
does not determine fault or liability, and under 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b), the NTSB may not
allow any evidence gathered to be used in a civil action for damages as mentioned in the
report (Sumwalt & Dalton, 2016).
Once the NTSB is notified of an aircraft accident, a Response Operations Center
dispatches a response team to the site. The NTSB may grant party status to outside
agencies who have vested interest in the accident or could provide helpful insight. With
party status, the organization is prohibited from using any data or collected evidence in
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use toward prosecution or litigation. Ultimately, the role of the NSTB is to collect
evidence, discover causal factors, and make recommendations to prevent further
occurrences.
Proactive Programs
There are many proactive safety programs in use throughout the aviation industry.
One of the most familiar tools is the basic operational risk management (ORM)
assessment designed to evaluate the amount of risk a flight crew may experience based
on flight composition, environmental factors, and tasks required of the flight. Other,
more complicated proactive safety programs are more extensive and require significant
personnel to analyze the data. Large and complicated proactive safety programs include
the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA),
and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA).
ASAP is one of the easiest ways for front-line operators to voice safety concerns
with upper management. The FAA created ASAP with the goal to enhance aviation
safety through preventative communication by allowing voluntary reporting of safety
issues (FAA, 2017). In order to encourage additional reporting, program designers
developed incentives. By the beginning of 2017, 95 air carriers were actively involved
with the FAA’s ASAP program, with many of the participating airlines additionally
including their maintenance personnel, flight attendants, and dispatchers (FAA, 2017).
The U.S. Air Force similarly adopted a military version of ASAP in 2011 and
constantly promotes the use of the program. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-225 dictates
the requirements and purposes of ASAP as a program designed for Airmen to report
information critical to resolving mishaps (2015). Military members can submit identity
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protected reports through a DoD-controlled website (asap.safety.af.mil) while general
aviation pilots can file safety reports through the Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) website (asrs.arc.nasa.gov). Within a majority of major airlines, operators can
report safety concerns through ASAP if their airline supports the program. Once filed,
upper levels of management and safety personnel review the reports for potential safety
concerns and suggest appropriate proactive actions.
FOQA is another resource used to examine safety in a proactive way. The FAA
enacted FOQA in 2004 with the release of Advisory Circular (AC) 120-82. The AC
explains how the program is voluntary but may utilize confidential and proprietary
information without the fear of reprimand or disclosure. The program allows commercial
airlines to share aggregate information with the FAA to address operational risk issues in
aviation. According to the FAA, the key element in FOQA is the application of
corrective actions to assure the unsafe conditions being discovered are effectively
mitigated (FAA, 2004b). Information recorded can include stability criteria at specific
airfields during different times of day or year depending on search parameters.
AFI 91-225 describes a similar military FOQA process: the analysis and trending
of aircraft system and flight performance data to enhance combat readiness through
improvements in operations, maintenance, training, and safety functions (2015). The AFI
allows technicians to contact aircrew for the purposes of gathering additional information
only but does not allow the prosecution of aircrew or maintainers. With a successful
FOQA program, the FAA can effectively change and evaluate operational safety, aircraft
and crew performance, training effectiveness, and more (FAA, 2004b).
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LOSA is another tool available to proactively address aviation safety (FAA,
2014). The Line Operations Safety Assessment allows management to gather key safety
information through peer observations in the cockpit. The FAA (2014) maintains LOSA
is anonymous and voluntary and provides valuable information for data verification and
safety awareness. The U.S. Air Force has a similar LOSA program. AFI 91-225
emphasizes that LOSAs are not check rides or evaluations—the audits are conducted by
silent observers who document all operations that influence aircrew (2015). Significant
findings from LOSAs can lead to suggested systems changes to operators and
management.
Military and Civil Differences in Safety Reporting
Finding ways to encourage pilots to submit safety information can be a struggle.
The FAA (through NASA) encourages safety reporting through the promises of
confidentiality and immunity using either ASRS or ASAP. The primary difference
between ASRS and ASAP are the managers of the program. ASRS is an FAA program
designed to apply to all general aviation operators. However, an operation may have
their own ASAP, and if it is accepted by the Event Review Committee (ERC) (a division
of the FAA), the ASAP report is considered the same as an ASRS report (the main
difference being the ability for the organization to also see the safety concern).
According to the ASRS website, all reports sent through the system are held in strict
confidence. The reports are cleansed by removing times, dates, and any related
information which could lead to identifying an individual (NASA, 2016). The ASRS
website briefly explains additional FAA incentives:
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The FAA has committed itself not to use ASRS information against
reporters in enforcement actions. It has also chosen to waive fines and
penalties, subject to certain limitations, for unintentional violations of
federal aviation statutes and regulations which are reported to ASRS. The
FAA's initiation, and continued support of the ASRS program and its
willingness to waive penalties in qualifying cases is a measure of the value
it places on the safety information gathered, and the products made
possible through incident reporting to the ASRS. (NASA, 2016, p.1)
In 2011, the FAA released Advisory Circular (AC) 00-46E as a replacement to
AC 00-46D dated February 26, 1997. AC 00-46D authorizes NASA to continue
to act as a third-party facilitator to receive and process safety reports as they have
done since the program inception in 1975. The AC prohibits the use of any report
submitted to NASA in any disciplinary action with the exception of criminal
offenses or information concerning accidents.
AC 00-46E specifically states the FAA is required to enforce statute 14
CFR in a manner that will reduce or eliminate the possibility of aircraft accidents.
However, there are multiple factors the FAA will consider when enforcing
statutes including the nature of the violation, experience, attitude, and time since
last occurrence. The FAA, in AC-0046E, considers the submission of an ASAP
report concerning an incident or occurrence to be indicative of a constructive
attitude, thus even if a violation is found, civil penalty and certificate suspension
could not be enforced (FAA, 2011).
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Restrictions from AC 00-46E (2011) mandate the enforcement shall not be
imposed if:
1. The violation was inadvertent and not deliberate;
2. The violation did not involve a criminal offense, accident, or action under
49 U.S.C. § 44709, which discloses a lack of qualification or competency,
which is wholly excluded from this policy;
3. The person has not been found in any prior FAA enforcement action to
have committed a violation of 49 U.S.C. subtitle VII, or any regulation
promulgated there for a period of five years prior to the date of
occurrence;
4. The person proves that, within 10 days after the violation, or date when
the person became aware or should have been aware of the violation, he or
she completed and delivered or mailed a written report of the incident or
occurrence to NASA.
The U.S. Air Force has a different stance toward safety reporting while maintaining a
mentality of identity-protection through the submission of ASAP reports. According to
the USAF ASAP website (asap.safety.af.mil):
ASAP provides a non-punitive environment for the open reporting of
safety concerns and information that might not be reported by other
means. ASAP reports are identity-protected, meaning if you include your
name in your report, it will not be made public. (USAF, 2017, p. 1)
Available on the website is a link for leadership endorsements from four major
commands and two Wings. Colonel Armagost advocates positively for the
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program in an endorsement to the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot, ND, “…this identityprotected, self-reporting, and non-punitive program is designed to encourage
voluntary reporting to highlight a hazardous situation, unintentional error, or
hidden risk” (2016, p. 1). In General Carlisle’s endorsement to the Air Combat
Command, “airmen can use [ASAP] to share a lesson learned beyond their
squadron” (2014, p. 1). General Everhart, in his memorandum to Air Mobility
Command states, “Per AFI 91-225, data collected from ASAP, MFOQA, and
LOSA will not be used to monitor personnel performance to initiate qualification
downgrade or decertification, nor to take adverse personnel actions including
reprimands, nonjudicial punishment, or court-martial” (2015, p. 1).
In multiple endorsements from high-level commanders, the ASAP
website, and the parenting regulation AFI 11-225, ASAP is a non-punitive
program designed for proactive safety use. However, no literature exists
mirroring the FAA’s ability to protect military pilots against violations. In
essence, a civil professional pilot may make an error while flying and have the
ability to escape punishment based on the FAAs criteria listed in AC 00-46E;
military pilots do not have the same luxury. Submitting an ASAP in the U.S.
military does not prohibit charges or punishment being brought against an
individual.
Role of the unit commander. In the U.S. Air Force, unit commanders have the
ability to assign and remove an operator’s qualifications based on their assessments of
events. According to AFI11-202V2, Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation (Stan/Eval)
Program (2012), the purpose of Stan/Eval is to provide commanders a tool to validate
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aircrew readiness. At the higher levels, the major command’s (AETC, AMC, ACC, etc.)
staffs are responsible for setting policy and establishing administrative processes; lower
echelons of command are primarily responsible for the flying and evaluation functions.
AFI 11-202V2 explains the qualification status of flyers: a Q-1 indicates an
aircrew member is qualified and demonstrates the desired performance and knowledge of
procedures, equipment, and directives within tolerances specified in grading criteria. A
Q-2 indicates a member was able to perform duties safely but there were one or more
areas where additional training was assigned. A Q-3 indicates a member demonstrates an
unacceptable level of safety, performance, or knowledge. It is important to note that an
overall grade of Q-1 or Q-2 will be given only after all evaluation requirements have
been completed; an overall grade of Q-3 may be awarded at anytime to include
operational, training, or simulator missions (AFI11-202V3, 2012). Any commander may
direct a downgrade (Q-3) without administering an evaluation for flying-related cases
including flight discipline and flight safety (AFI11-202V3, 2012). Incidents do not have
to be directly observed by an examiner to earn a Q-3, but may be recommended by an
examiner from any aircrew specialty; should an operator perform an operation that is
deemed unsafe or out of tolerances, and if the information is shared with a unit
commander, the commander may issue a Q-3 to the operator or entire aircrew.
A commander may not use information provided by ASAP, LOSA, or
FOQA to reprimand a pilot—a commander cannot use any information gathered
from a safety source for the purposes of punishment. However, if a commander
uses other means to discover information, punishment may be administered (AFI
91-202, 2016).
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FAA Enforcement. The FAA’s power to enforce safety standards and the
Federal Aviation Regulations allows them to revoke aviation licenses. There are five
types of actions the FAA typically uses:


Administrative action



Reexamination



Certificate action



Civil penalty



Criminal action

For small safety deviations, the FAA may use administrative action the form of a
warning notice or letter of correction. Following recommended FAA training, the case is
closed. More commonly, however, certificate actions are taken against pilots by
suspending or revoking a license. Operational violations of the flight rules or indication
of technical proficiency typically are triggers for license suspension (Yodice, 2011).
Under Reporting
Reporting adverse events, especially near misses, is essential for improving safety
(Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015)—safety reports provide useful data-points to help improve
workplace and occupational safety (Davies & Steinke, 2015). A significant underreporting of safety concerns exists throughout multiple industries (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui,
2015). The effectiveness of a proactive safety program rests with the assumption that a
free-flow information channel exists and is used judiciously to promote awareness of
incidents, accidents, unsafe behaviors, and simple concerns (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015).
According to Gilbey et al. (2015), the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) claims the accurate and timely reporting of relevant information related to
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hazards reported by front-line personnel is one of the best sources of data. Despite the
high-level of suspected under-reporting, some are taking the lead to understand and
combat the situation, including the New Zealand Civil Aviation Administration
(NZCAA) (Gilbey et al., 2015). Literature suggests there are multiple reasons for
individuals not to report safety concerns to their organization’s management, including
repercussion, convenience, significance of event, and value (Freiwald, 2013; Griffin &
Neal; Mullen, 2004; Pransky, Snyder, Allard, & Himmelstein, 1999).
Safety Culture Effects on Reporting Safety Concerns
There exists a desired correlation between a positive safety culture and
individuals submitting safety concerns. “Findings from Neal and Griffin (2002) support
the relationship of safety climate and safety behavior….and a similar relationship
between compliance and safety participation” (Freiwald, 2013, p. 31). Wiegmann et al.
(2002) describe safety culture as an enduring value and priority placed on worker and
public safety … and the extent to which individuals and groups commit to personal
responsibility to safety, of which is included to communicate safety concerns (Broyhill,
2016).
In his dissertation, Freiwald (2013) argues two main issues hamper safety climate:
1) the nature of the construct and 2) the relationship among safety climate and
organizational outcomes such as safety knowledge and motivation, safety behavior, and
workplace accidents. Freiwald (2013) continues to argue the perceptions of safety
culture influence employee actions and safety behavior in the workplace. One direct
measure of an employee proactively employing safety measures is to provide an ASAP
report. Freiwald (2013) argues through the work of Barling et al. (2002) that the

43
perceptions of safety climate mediated a relationship of leadership and safety events,
which in turn predicted occupational injuries. The most immediate predictor of
occupational injuries are safety-related events, or close calls (Barling et al., 2002).
Freiwald (2013) discusses the work of Cree and Kelloway (1997) and how safety
participation, including the initiative of an employee to voluntarily participate in safety
activities and programs, are active signs of positive safety culture. Another predictor of
safety participation is motivation (Griffin & Neal, 2000). Freiwald (2013) argues through
positive safety culture and leadership, a positive relationship exists which supports the
voluntary participation in safety activities. Freiwald (2013) argues perceived risk directly
predicts participation (Cree & Calloway, 1997; Goldberg, Dar-El, & Rubin, 1991),
essentially establishing the significance of an event contributes to response rates. Mullen
(2004) argues individuals who experience close calls or safety-related events display
higher-levels of safety participation (Freiwald, 2013).
Griffin and Neal (2000) found perceptions of knowledge about safety
significantly influenced self-reports of safety compliance and safety participation
(Freiwald, 2013), and positively identifying perceived value in the system attributed to
higher reporting.
Perceived Repercussion. Fear of reprisal is a large part of under-reporting
(Pransky, Snyder, Allard, & Himmelstein,1999). According to Davies and Steinke, a
mature safety culture is developed where individuals feel free to report safety concerns
knowing “they will not be shot” (2015, p. 1234). In a study completed by Cubbin in
2000, of 563 general-aviation commercial pilots surveyed, 32% admitted they failed to
disclose a medical treatment on their FAA applications for fear of disqualification or
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other administrative hardship toward their careers (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015). In a
different study by Probst and Estrada (2010), 64 percent of respondents indicated they
had at least one negative consequence after submitting a safety report, ranging from poor
impersonal treatment and adverse job outcomes to reassignment of less-favorable tasks.
Palali and Ours (2017) suggest general statistics about workplace safety are inaccurate
because workers often under-report safety concerns due to fear of penalty. Even if
someone is aware of a safety event, it is possible they will not report the event for fear of
punishment by management, which is a direct impact from a poor safety culture.
Medium Convenience. Gilbey, Tani, and Tsui (2015) hypothesize one possible
explanation for a lack of safety reporting is the inconvenience of completing the safety
report itself. Specifically, Gilbey et al. (2015) discuss the disadvantage of not being able
to immediately report a situation due to significant other tasks needing to be performed,
time for completion of the report, or simple memory loss of the event. For example, a
pilot experiencing a safety concern on initial takeoff from New York to London may
have over six hours before a report can be completed. In that time, memory loss can
occur, other important tasks will be accomplished, and post-flight activities must be
completed. The report, which may require access to an internet connection, telephone, or
quiet place from which to communicate, can contribute to under-reporting. In this
situation, the safety report is considered an unimportant task, especially if the occurrence
was not considered significant.
Significance of Event. Literature suggests the severity of the event-in-question
affects an individual’s likeliness to report a concern. In a study conducted by Gilbey,
Tani, and Tsui, “bad outcomes were judged as more likely to be reported than identical
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acts with innocuous outcomes” (2015, p. 141) Gilbey et al. (2015) suggest if there is no
publicity about an event, it may be assumed that the outcome of the concern was
innocuous, and therefore, the concern was probably groundless. If the individual
perceives an event as innocuous, high potential exists for under-reporting.
Program Value. Gilbey, Tani, and Tsui (2015) suggest a lack of priority toward
safety could contribute to an under-reported safety program. Connected to the
significance of an event, under-reported situations may occur because the time, energy,
and effort involved in completing a document, along with the effort to follow through
with the report, may be deemed out of proportion to the perceived significance of the
event itself. In addition, if workers feel managers will be unresponsive or unconcerned
with safety incidents, they are less likely to report concerns (Probst & Estrada, 2010). If
no incident investigation or corrective actions are expected from reported accidents,
employees may feel it is pointless to bring forward information (Probst & Estrada, 2010).
Survey Use
In 2014, Steckel formally published his dissertation “Developing and establishing
the validity and reliability of the perceptions toward aviation safety action program
(ASAP) and line operations safety audit (LOSA) questionnaires” (doctoral dissertation).
Steckel (2014) researched the factors (perceptions) that influence whether an air carrier
pilot would participate in the ASAP or LOSA program through the use of a survey
instrument. Steckel’s research hinged around theory presented by Slovic’s work of
qualifying specific valuations of risk individuals were willing to accept. Based on
identified barriers to safety reporting in aviation and healthcare, along with his extensive
commercial pilot experience, Steckel developed factors for the ASAP scales.
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As part of his dissertation research, Steckel developed a survey instrument which
was reviewed by a dissertation committee with experience in research methodology and
organizational psychology along with seven airline pilots. Feedback was used to further
refine the factors. Ultimately, Steckel (2014) was able to utilize five distinct factors
which contributed to under-reporting in ASAP as researched from his literature review:
perception of ease of use, perception of value, perception of program trust, perception of
risk, and perception of management trust. At the end of his study, Steckel ultimately
combined perception of risk and perception of management trust into one category. The
survey itself contained a minimum of three indicator items for each scale indicator as
demonstrated in Table 1.
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Table 1
Scale Indicators and Indicator Items for the ASAP Program
Survey in Steckel's Dissertation (2014)
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6
Item 7
Item 8
Item 9
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4

Perception of Ease of Use
Does not take much time to submit
Easy to access ASAP program to submit
Asks for relevant information
Perception of Value
ID hazards
ID errors
Worth my time to participate
Generally effective
Personal feedback to improve job
Company communication to improve job
Improve workplace safety
Improve work procedures
Will improve training
Perception of Program Trust
People who analyze data can be trusted
ASAP program designed to protect data
Form asks for data that can be traced
Perception of Risk
FAA could initiate enforcement action
Information released through criminal investigation
Information released through civil litigation
Information released through FOIA
Perception of Management Trust
Risk if I don't participate
Could punish intentional errors
Could punish unintentional errors
Management will protect data

Steckel mailed 60,000 surveys to current FAA commercial pilots and received
4,400 surveys within a month, of which approximately 2,000 surveys were considered
usable. Due to the quantity of surveys received, approximately half of the surveys were

48
used to determine the fit of the model, and the other half were used to confirm the model
specification.
Scales were analyzed for reliability and validity using Confirmatory Factor
Analysis and the split sample method for loose cross-validation. The structural model
was measured for validity using convergent and discriminant validity, while reliability of
the model was analyzed using composite reliability. Steckel’s results include a change of
the 5-factor model; the a priori model was not as good of a fit as much as the 4-factor,
when two of the elements were combined due to a poor construct reliability <0.70 for
management trust. The 5-factor scale resulted in 17 items being measured, with each of
the factors consisting of three indicators. There was no covariance between the error
terms. One particular factor, ease of use (AVE = 0.50), did not show acceptable
discriminate validity; yet overall, the results showed strong evidence to support using the
final ASAP model specification (Steckel, 2014).

Figure 3. Steckel’s ASAP model fit test (2014).
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Figure 4. Steckel's ASAP measurement model (2014).
Steckel was able to determine that of the five factors, the factor ease of use did
not show acceptable convergent or discriminate validity. Using Cronbach’s Alpha, the
other four factors were able to test without problems.
In his discussion, Steckel suggested a 5-10 member focus group would help
develop potential factors and scale items for future research. In 2016, Air Mobility
Command used a non-validated survey to gain initial feedback about the military ASAP
program. The survey closely follows Steckel’s initial survey but is reworded for military
purposes—Appendix A. Steckel confirmed in his discussion the ASAP factors had
acceptable reliability and convergent validity.
Theoretical Research Model
The proposed model was composed mainly from Steckel’s dissertation but was
changed slightly based on literature review. Steckel initially included five primary
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factors but later consolidated them into four factors: ease of use, program value,
program/management trust, and risk. The proposed hypothetical structural for this
dissertation used three of the four factors used by Steckel, but renames risk to
repercussion, ease of use to inconvenience, and program value to perceived value. The
proposed structural model included a modified factor, program/management trust, and
combined it with risk. The researcher added inconvenience based on literature review.
A large majority of the literature review was based on safety culture with a basis
of just culture, reporting culture, and others. It was the belief of the researcher, based on
a literature review of safety culture, that an organization that harbors a strong safety
culture will tend to have a higher reporting rate than not. For this reason, the researcher
assumed a basic safety culture exists in AMC based on the SMS being utilized. The
research was simply attempting to dig deeper into specifics about the culture which may
or may lead to operators reporting safety concerns. If an individual believes an event is
insignificant, but reports the safety concern anyways, the individual is demonstrating a
strong safety reporting culture.
Based on the literature reviewed and the previous study conducted by Steckel, six
hypotheses were developed in the theoretical model and displayed in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Hypothetical structural model.
The hypotheses are written explanations of the structural model in Figure 5.
H1:

Perceived repercussion was positively related to operators submitting ASAP
reports. In the proposed path diagram, it was hypothesized that the fear of
repercussion had a positive influence on a crewmember’s submission of ASAP
reports—operators who felt they could or would be punished for submitting
optional safety reports were less likely to report safety concerns.

H2:

Inconvenience was positively related to operators’ intentions to use ASAP. It was
hypothesized that inconvenient processes had a positive influence on operators
submitting ASAP reports—whether the factor was due to time, other
responsibilities, or lack of medium to respond, aircrews were more likely not to
report the safety concern if the medium was inconvenient to do so.
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H3:

The significance of an event was positively related to operators submitting ASAP
reports. It was hypothesized that the significance of an event positively
influenced an operator’s decision to report safety concerns—if an operator felt the
event had an insignificant outcome, they were less likely to report the safety
concern.

H4:

The perceived value of the ASAP program was positively related to operators
submitting ASAP reports. It was hypothesized the perceived value of the
program positively influenced whether an operator reported a safety concern—if
an operator felt there was little value in the program including incentives, followup capabilities, organizational improvement, etc., the operator was less likely to
report the safety concern.

H5:

The perceived value of the ASAP program was positively related to the perceived
significance of an event. It was hypothesized that the perceived value of the
program positively influences how significant the event may appear to the
operator—an operator who believed there was high value in the program would
report an event regardless of significance level.

H6.

The perceived value of the ASAP program was positively related to
inconvenience. It was hypothesized that the perceived value of the program
positively influenced the perceived inconvenience of the program—an operator
who believed there was significant value in the program would tend to report
safety concerns, even if the medium was inconvenient.
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Summary
The FAA takes great strides to emphasize safety culture by providing incentives
to aircrew members. However, the USAF did little to incentivize proactive safety—at the
time of this study, no reward or inability to protect against retribution for ASAP
submissions existed in the Air Force.
A crewmember’s perception of punishment comes from the ability for any
commander to immediately decertify (Q-3) a crewmember. While a crewmember may
receive a Q-3 downgrade on a normal evaluation, it is possible and common for aircrew
members to receive commander-directed Q-3s, the equivalent to an FAA violation.
There exists a potential fear of punishment for crewmembers to receive Q-3s from ASAP
reports, when simple word-of-mouth is enough to start a Q-3 process. The literature
indicates the perception of punishment connected with ASAP hampers the submission
rate.
The USAF has attempted to make ASAP convenient and available to front-line
operators. “Hot keys” exist in computer training programs to allow direct access to the
ASAP websites. However, the military ASAP is a government-based website and must
be accessed on a government machine only. Combined with long duty days and excess
amounts of paperwork required to be accomplished post-mission, it was likely ASAP was
not considered convenient by many aircrews (T. Grosz, personal communication, 15
September 2016). In 2017, OpsRAMS conducted an experiment with select reserve
units. The intent was to determine if capabilities to report safety concerns on an
automatically-updating electronic flight bag would encourage reporting. The results had
not been published by the time of this writing.
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Due to lack of incentives, it is likely there was no perceived value or vested
interest in the military ASAP by front-line operators (T. Grosz, personal communication,
15 September 2016). The FAA provided valuable incentives to aviators through ASAP
by rewarding those who had a safety-driven mindset (NASA, 2016). Because the FAA
saw the submission of accurate and timely ASAP reports as an active safety mindset, the
FAA had the ability to waive certain violations (NASA, 2016). The military offered no
similar ability to prevent a downgrade or Q-3 by submitting a safety report, thus offering
little self-value. OpsRAMS was primarily responsible for the advocation of ASAP along
with LOSA and MFOQA. Through read files, newspapers, safety briefings, magazines,
and more, the safety team at OpsRAMS strongly attempted to bring awareness about the
ASAP program to the heart of AMC. OpsRAMS was interested if more awareness would
correlate with more reports (T. Grosz, personal communication, 15 September 2016).
Four potential factors were extracted from the literature and are believed to
contribute directly to an operator’s intentions to submit ASAP reports. The four factors
of repercussion, inconvenience, significance of an event, and perceived program value
were likely related to the lack of ASAP reports.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine how much influence four
potential factors had on operator’s intentions to submit ASAP reports; the four factors
were repercussion, inconvenience, significance of an event, and perceived program
value. The individual constructs for each factor were developed based off literature
review and previous research. The hypotheses were developed from relevant research
suggesting contributing factors of whether USAF mobility operators submit ASAP
reports or not. Structural equation modeling was determined to be the preferential
statistical method due to the ability investigate relations between sets of observed and
latent variables (Byrne, 2010). Once a measurement model was specified for the SEM
process, an adequate sample size was calculated. The survey was designed as an
instrument to produce empirical results using the Likert Scale and was pre-tested for
validity. Once the survey proved valid for research, full Institutional Review Board
procedures were followed to ensure all ethical research procedures were considered. The
researcher used the survey to collect data from participating aircrew members at Air
Mobility Command headquarters and attained the minimum required responses. Data
collected from the instrument was compiled, cleaned, and evaluated with descriptive
statistics, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation modeling. Initial data was
used as part of a pilot study to assess construct reliability—in this process, some
individual constructs were removed to ensure reliability. The rest of the data was used to
test validity of the measurement model where multiple model-fit tests were used to test
for validity. When the model was not initially considered an adequate fit, the researcher
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adjusted the model as suggested by IBM SPSS AMOS 25. Once an acceptable fit was
constructed, the structural model was specified and the data were used to assess validity,
once again adjusting the model as required for proper fit. With a valid structural model,
the hypotheses were analyzed for overall results.
Research Approach
This research study was theory-driven in nature—the desired outcome was to
determine the amount of influence each of the four named factors had on the submission
rate of ASAP reports in Air Mobility Command. This study was also nonexperimental—there was no feasible manner for the researcher to manipulate the
variables in an experimental approach (Vogt et al., 2012). A survey was determined to be
most effective in acquiring data.
According to Vogt et al. (2012), surveys are among the most commonly utilized
instruments for social and behavioral research and are used for descriptive, explanatory,
and exploratory purposes (Babbie, 2013). Survey research is an excellent way to gather
original data describing a population when the entire population is too large to observe,
and is a great tool for measuring attitudes and orientations (Babbie, 2013). The intended
survey was designed to sample the Air Mobility Command operator structure with belief
that aircrews who participate would provide honest responses to the questions about
actual reporting procedures and thoughts. The survey questions were short, clear, precise
and presented in a way to avoid ambiguous answers (Babbie, 2013).
Structural Equation Modeling, a confirmatory approach, is unlike explanatory
research—the research aims to confirm or deconfirm a specific generalization, usually a
theory (Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012). According to Byrne (2010), the best-known
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statistical procedure for investigating relations between sets of observed and latent
variables is factor analysis. With factor analysis, the researcher examines the covariation
among observed variables in order to gather information on the underlying latent
constructs (Byrne, 2010). Confirmatory factor analysis is one type of factor analysis used
by researchers when there is knowledge of the latent variable structure. The researcher
can postulate relations between the observed measures and the underlying factors a priori
in order to test the hypothesized structure statistically.
Research Design
This study used a cross-sectional survey design, followed by quantitative analysis,
by incorporating structural equation modeling (SEM) to test hypotheses in a confirmatory
manner. The researcher designed a theoretical model based on published literature and
hypotheses constructed by the researcher based on literature. The measurement model
was tested for an appropriate fit and adjusted as needed, and then used as part of a
structural model to test hypotheses. The factors were similarly named from Steckel’s
research (2014) and given abbreviations as required. The exogenous variable was
intention to use ASAP, and the endogenous variables were repercussion, significance of
event, perceived value, and inconvenience.
Design and Procedures. The researcher used confirmatory factor analysis to test
a measurement model as part of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). SEM is a
methodology for representing, estimating, and testing a network of relationships between
measured variables and latent constructs, where the causal processes of interest are
represented by a series of regression equations (Byrne, 2010).
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The variable constructs hypothesized by the researcher were created based on
similar research by Steckel (2014); in his model, Steckel (2014) theorized four factors
contributed to under-reporting: ease of use, value, trust, and risk. The model for this
research closely adapted Steckel’s research; however, the researcher also correlated a
connection between significance of event and perceived value, along with perceived value
and inconvenience.
Research Procedures
The dissertation followed a general SEM process from Hair et al. (2010), as
shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Research procedure.
The researcher defined the individual constructs based on review of existing
literature. The measurement model was developed, sample size was established, and a
research study (survey) was designed based on Steckel’s Ph.D. dissertation (2014)
instrument (modified for the military environment). USAF IRB processes were not
required; however, ERAU IRB processes were completed in accordance with ERAU
guidelines to ensure safe and ethical procedures were followed. Once IRB approval was
gained, the researcher conducted a conducted a pretest, then utilized the survey to gather
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data and assess the measurement model. After assessing the measurement model for fit,
the researcher revised the measurement model to ensure an adequate model fit existed.
The structural model was specified, and the data was then used to assess the validity of
the structural model. The results were then analyzed and published.
Population/Sample
The population of interest was Air Force Active Duty, Reserve, and Air National
Guard mobility operators. The active duty Air Force are full-time airmen, whose primary
jobs are all-inclusive to the United States Air Force. Reservists and Guardsmen often
participate significantly less than an active duty airmen but utilize the same equipment
and deploy to the same theater with similar missions. Of note, only Air Mobility
Command was being sampled for this research. Should other commands, to include Air
Combat Command, Global Strike Command, Air Education Command, and Special
Operations Command be interested, the same survey could easily be utilized. Using
Westland’s (2010) model for SEM sample population, with an anticipated effect size δ of
0.2, a desired statistical power level of 0.80, 5 latent variables k, 12 observed variables j,
and a probability level of 0.05, the minimum sample size for model structure was n = 308
with a recommended minimum sample size of 376.
Convenience sampling was used to gather the observations at AMC Headquarters,
Scott AFB, IL. The individuals partaking in the survey were AMC personnel, to include
boom operators, loadmasters, and flight engineers who underwent orientation training.
The individuals going through orientation were collaboration airmen attending advanced
training from around the world, representing all AMC bases and aircraft. The orientation
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courses were two days in length and mandatory for all instructors and aircraft captains-intraining. The operators attending the orientation had a minimum of two years of AMC
flying experience and worked directly with aircraft captains, instructors, and evaluators.
The operators attending the orientation were very familiar with the flying environment
and the AMC lifestyle and have been molded specifically by instructors and evaluators as
they prepared for advanced training. It was expected, at this point in the upgrade process,
for the operators attending orientation to have a firm grasp of the aviation environment
and the safety programs available. Because OpsRAMS was unable to test the entire
AMC population without Pentagon approval, they were interested in testing this
particular group of individuals as a measure of the amount of safety taught by operational
instructors prior to advanced training.
Data Collection Device
The intended research apparatus was a safety culture survey adapted from
Steckel’s dissertation (2014). Steckel’s research focused on the FAA ASAP program. In
his dissertation, Steckel developed and established the reliability and validity of the
perceptions toward ASAP, using his survey. The intended survey for this research has
many similarities but is altered to be military specific. The survey asks for professional
information to include aircraft flown, current base assignment, and military status.
Steckel’s survey is listed as Appendix C, while the survey for this research is listed in
Appendix A. Similar to Steckel, the survey utilized a 5-point Likert scale to assess
responses.
In comparison to Steckel’s factors, Table 2 proposed the new factors and
associated items (Cree & Calloway, 1997; Freiwald, 2013; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Steckel,
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2014). Input from AMC safety personnel and experienced Air Force pilots ensured
strong construct validity. Three safety subject matter experts were allowed to review the
survey for both content structure. Air Force Safety experts had training in SMS,
preventative safety, and were familiar with the ASAP program.

Table 2
Proposed factors and items for survey use
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Factor
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3

Repercussion
Truly identity protected
Submit reports despite being wrong
Commanders trust in the program
Inconvenience
Convenience
Time usage
Post-mission priority
Significance of an event
Small deviation
Major deviation
Safety of flight, at fault
Program value
Value is seen
Worth my time
Effective in improving safety

Ethical Issues
According to Babbie (2013), ethical considerations in survey research are
relatively minor compared with experimental research due to a simplified and hands-off
interaction. However, surveys still attempt to gather private, personal information about
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individuals; information which is not readily available to the public (Babbie, 2013). In
order to maintain ethical standards, multiple safeguards are built into the research.
First, participation by the selected individuals is voluntary; simply taking the
survey constituted consent. The research garnered Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University (ERAU) IRB approval; the survey, methodology, and intent of the research
were all submitted for review. In the review, it was stipulated that consent to take the
survey was given by the fact that the individuals participate, as long as a pre-read script
was either read or provided to the subject (Appendix B). The survey itself explained the
consent needed, and in addition, the pre-read script described the purpose of the research,
the ability for the survey to be identity protected, and the ability to quit the survey at any
time. The researcher provided details in writing (refer to Appendix B) about the purpose
of the survey and the particulars about participation. Participation was voluntary; the
participants could decide to quit the survey at any time or refuse the study completely.
The survey promoted privacy and protection from harm to the individuals—all answers
remained confidential with no personal information attempted to be collected or any
efforts made to identify individuals. Participants could skip any question, and the survey
administer would not insist upon completed surveys. All surveys were stored in the
AMC Safety headquarters in a protected location.
Pretest
A pretest was administered to ensure strong face validity. The survey instrument
was pre-tested in a similar manner to Tayyem, Atkinson, and Martin’s (2014) procedures:
Tayyem et al. tested a survey using 12 individuals who were not subsequently used for
the research. The individuals taking the test were asked questions about the readability,
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relevance, and impact of the questions to test for face and content validity. Feedback and
comments from the group were analyzed by a panel of experts to modify ambiguous
terms, clarify confusion, and formulate new ideas as required. The goal was to ensure the
participants understand the questions and were responding to the questions as designed
for the construct. If participants of the pretest were confused by wording or it was clear
the intent of the question was misleading, the questions were either removed or reworded.
Face Validity. Face validity is a subjective way of essentially ensuring the
concepts are actually measuring what is intended (Hair et al., 2010) and is measured by
analyzing the measures in each construct to ensure intentions were met. Face validity
was analyzed by experienced aviation safety professionals who examined the instrument
prior to implementation as part of the pretest.
SEM Assumptions
When testing SEM, there were some required underlying test assumptions that
exist. One of the biggest assumptions that must be made for SEM is that the data must
have a multivariate normal distribution (Byrne, 2010). In addition, three critically
important assumptions exist with the use of the ordinal data: (1) under each categorical
observed variable was an unobserved, normally distributed latent variable; (2) the sample
size was large enough to sufficiently enable reliable estimation; and (3) the number of
observed variables was kept to a minimum (Byrne, 2010). Prior to conducting analysis of
the measurement model, the data needed to be prepared by treating for missing data,
testing normality assumptions, and searching for outliers.
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Data Collection
The survey was handed-out in paper format to each upgrading operator at the
safety conference. The surveys were collected and mailed to the researcher who input the
results into IBM SPSS. Even though the survey was optional, a high level of
participation was anticipated and unofficially occurred. The only demographic
information collected was current upgrading aircraft and location. No internal
information was solicited, and the researcher did not attempt to match information to any
individuals as a means to uphold anonymity. Non-response is possible for multiple
reasons, typically including poorly constructed surveys, lengthy surveys, inappropriate
audiences, or the inconvenience of the process. A large non-response was not anticipated
due to the short survey which was handed-out in person to a specific target. The survey
itself took less than five minutes to complete and was extremely convenient to enable
operators to participate. Of the 386 surveys handed to participants, all 386 were returned.
Although only 332 were usable due to missing information, strong participation was
observed in the study.
Treatment of the Data
This study used SEM as a primary means of analyzing data. SEM is a “statistical
methodology that takes a confirmatory approach to the analysis of a structural theory”
(Byrne, 2010, p. 3). Steps included analyzing descriptive statistics followed by
performing a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on a measurement model. Prior to
conducting analysis, the data was prepared to include treatment of missing data,
assumption testing, outliers, and transformation.
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Data Preparation and Missing Data. Because SEM does not handle missing
data well, each survey questionnaire with missing data was considered for either
complete removal of all data or the imputation of data. There are multiple considerations
for whether to remove a questionnaire or simply impute the data, and Hair et al. (2010)
discuss an entire process to determine the outcome of missing data. If the data is
considered missing at random (MAR), an imputation process may be used to estimate the
missing values, based on valid values of other variables (Hair et al., 2010). The mean
substitution method is easily implemented and provides all cases with complete
information; however, it will reduce variance of the distribution, will slightly distort the
distribution, and will depress observed correlations (Hair et al., 2010). This method is
good for relatively low levels of missing data. Mean substitution replaces the missing
value with the mean value of all available data of that variable. Had an individual survey
returned with more than 25% missing data, the survey would have been considered for
removal. Had an individual question been omitted more than 25%, it would have been
considered for removal. No single question returned more than 25% missing data.
Outliers. Outliers can be measured using the Mahalanobis D2 testing (Hair et al.,
2010). It is suggested conservative level of significance (.005 or.001) be used as a
threshold value as an outlier; thus, observations having a D2 value exceeded 3 or 4 in
large samples can be designated as a possible outlier (Hair et al., 2010). Once identified,
the researcher has the option to omit or retain the data. In this study, the data was
retained to prevent the risk of limiting generalizability.
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Assumptions Testing and Transformation. Data transformation provides a
means to modify variables to either correct violations or to improve correlations between
variables (Hair et al., 2010). While many techniques exist for transforming data,
transformation was not required for this study, as all assumptions were met. It was
necessary to test for multivariate normal data; some questions that returned bi-model
results were removed from the study.
Construct Validity. According to Hair et al. (2010), it is essential to measure the
items studied to ensure they actually represent the constructs they were expected to
measure, as alluded to by the literature. The formula for construct validity (CR) utilized
was:

wherein the squared sum of standardized loadings was divided by the sum of the
squared sum of standardized loadings and the sum of indicator measurement errors. The
researcher used Microsoft Excel to compute the validity.
Convergent Validity. There are many ways to measure convergent validity
(CV). CV is the degree to which multiple measures which should theoretically be related
are actually related (Hair et al., 2010). Convergent validity for this study was measured
using the standard equation for average variance extracted (AVE), along with factor
loadings (Hair et al., 2010).
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Discriminant Validity. Discriminant validity analyzes if each section is truly
unique and distinct to itself. It is also the measurement to determine if sections that
should not be related are not actually related (Hair et al., 2010). Discriminant validity
usually exists if a computed number less than 0.85 was calculated using the correlation
equation. The correlation equations were used, along with an additional method to
compare MSV with AVE, a commonly accepted method of testing discriminant validity.
Instrument Reliability. Reliability is the “degree to which the observed variable
measures the ‘true’ value and is ‘error free’” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 8), and was tested in
this research using Cronbach’s Alpha. The instrument of interest was a modified version
of Steckel’s proven ASAP survey instrument. The new instrument was reviewed by three
experts to ensure the survey was not a time-stamped instrument. Their bios are listed in
Appendix E. Experts were chosen based on their previous experience with peer-reviewed
instrument implementation and aviation knowledge to ensure the questions were
sufficient to meet the intent of the survey without dating the instrument. The pretest was
used to identify poor reliability using Cronbach’s Alpha, with Hair et al. (2010)
suggesting ranges >.70. Ranges less than .70 were considered for revision as the question
indicated a lower limit of acceptability.
The data was analyzed by SPSS for general statistics to include means, standard
deviations, skewness, and kurtosis. Frequency diagrams will be provided to visually
decode the data. The data itself was only cleaned and analyzed for the purposes of safety
information: no attempt was made to identify respondents or correlate identities with any
responses. A demographic about the current main weapons system (MWS) and location
was collected; however, no correlation between information and individuals took place.
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis
The next step in data analysis was a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). While
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is designed for situations where relationships between
observed and latent variables are unknown, CFA is more appropriate for the situation
where relationships are either known or hypothesized (Byrne, 2010). Because the CFA
model focuses solely on the link between factors and their associated measured variables,
the created framework becomes the measurement model (Byrne, 2010). In addition,
because the literature indicated multiple facets may influence an operator’s decision to
submit a safety report, along with a verified model from Steckel (2014), it was
appropriate to use confirmatory factor analysis to validate the proposed model. For this
purpose, it was essential to validate there were no missing data points and test for normal
data. SPSS was used to identify skewness and kurtosis.
The first-order CFA model was designed and tested for the multidimensionality of
theoretical construct, and thus the first assessment was to test if the intention to use ASAP
is a four-factor model comprising of repercussion, significance of event, perceived value,
and inconvenience. The model was input into IBM SPSS AMOS 25 to perform the factor
analysis. The model fit indices, as suggested by Byrne (2010), included x2 statistics,
RMSEA, GFI, CMIN/df, CFI, and NFI. Acceptable suggestions for optimal values
included:


RMSEA – <.06



GFI – >.90



AGFI— >.90



CFI – >.95



CMIN/df –

3
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NFI – >.90

The model was hypothesized as “fitting” by using a goodness-of-fit (GOF) test
and looking for unreasonable estimates or correlations ( >1.00, negative variances, or
invalid correlation matrices) (Byrne, 2010). GOF indicates how well the model
reproduces the observed covariance matrix among the indicator items (Hair et al., 2010)
and was used by observing both the chi-square GOF test and the degrees of freedom
GOF. Other tests considered were the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA), and normed chi-square.
The presence of standard errors that were either too small or too large suggested
inaccurate estimations; however, as defined by Joreskog and Sorbom (1989), no true
“small” or “large” have been established or defined (Byrne, 2010). After careful
examination of the model, a post hoc analysis was needed to either accept the model or
adjust and veer toward the explanatory approach.
After a satisfactory model fit, the model was tested for construct reliability and
construct validity (both convergent and discriminant will be addressed). “Reliability is a
measure of the degree to which a set of indicators of a latent construct is internally
consistent based on how highly interrelated the indicators are with each other” (Hair et
al., 2010, p. 548). Construct validity measures the extent to which the measured
variables actually represent the theoretical latent construct they are designed to measure
(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). The measurement model depicted specific rules
of correspondence between measured and latent variables—once the constructs were
defined, the models were used to assess the end of measurement error, or reliability (Hair
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et al., 2010). Convergent validity was assessed using average variance extracted (AVE)
with >.5 indicating an acceptable response (Hair et al., 2010). A reliability test was
utilized with the construct reliability (CR), with appropriate measures being >.70 (Hair et
al., 2010).
Once the tests were accepted by the researcher, the structural model was
established and tested. In a similar manner to the CFA performed on the measurement
model, the structural model was evaluated for fit and the hypotheses were reviewed using
standard regression weights and p-values for each relationship.
Summary
Individual constructs were developed based on a prior study and literature review.
A measurement model was developed, and a sample size was addressed. The survey was
created, and a pilot study was conducted to ensure usability. ERAU IRB procedures were
strictly followed to ensure proper ethical considerations were accounted for. Using the
survey, data was collected specifically targeting six hypotheses based on relevant
research suggesting contributing factors of whether an operator submits an ASAP report
or not. The data-collection instrument was designed to measure the amount of influence
each factor has on an individual’s decision to report safety concerns. Data collected from
the instrument was compiled, cleaned, and evaluated with descriptive statistics. After a
pretest, the measurement model was tested using confirmatory factor analysis, and then
the structural model was evaluated for fitness. The results are published in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to determine how much influence four potential
factors have on operator’s intentions to submit ASAP reports; the four factors were:
repercussion, inconvenience, significance of an event, and perceived program value. To
complete the study, the researcher collected data using surveys and analyzed the
information using IBM SPSS AMOS 25. The data was analyzed based on the structural
model shown in Figure 9. This chapter discusses the primary findings to include
descriptive statistics, the measurement model assessment using confirmatory factor
analysis, and the structural model assessment using structural equation modeling.
Pilot Study
The researcher received 58 surveys specifically for the pilot study. Of those
surveys, 10 were unusable due to missing data on eight of the responses--the respondents
completed less than two thirds of the survey (the back of the survey was not completed);
one respondent did not complete the survey at all, and one survey had multiple missed
questions. The remaining dataset of 48 samples was used to test for normality and
outliers, and then the reliability of the constructs using Cronbach’s Alpha. Table 3 shows
the reliability analysis. Cronbach’s Alpha was used to test reliability of each construct,
with alpha >.7 being the acceptable limit.
The constructs inconvenience, significance of event, program value, and operator
submits safety concern did not show acceptable reliability limits. Looking at the
histogram, it was determined that questions 5, 9, and 20 had poor kurtosis levels and were
removed. In removing some questions, the construct inconvenience was reduced to only
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two indicators; however, reducing the construct to two indicators still showed an
acceptable reliability of 0.767. Kline writes the rules for identifying a standard CFA
model include a model which has “two or more factors where each factor has two or
more indicators” (2016, p. 201), and thus allows the inconvenience permissible with only
two indicators.
The construct operator reports safety concern was scored for Cronbach’s Alpha
at 0.653, lower than the .7 recommended. However, due to the literature review and
researcher’s opinion, the reliability analysis is noted and will continue with the model.
The descriptive statistics for each question are presented in Table 4.

Table 3
Pilot Study
Original

Modified

Construct

Cronbach's
Alpha

Number of
indicators

Cronbach's
Alpha

Number of
indicators

Retribution
Significance of Event
Program value
Inconvenience
Operator Reports

0.765
0.694
0.694
0.509
0.416

7
5
6
3
6

0.765
0.757
0.725
0.767
0.653

7
3
5
2
3
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of Individual Questions
Question
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
6n
8n
11n
12n
19n
20n

N
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48

Minimum
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Maximum
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
5
5
5
4
4
5
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
4

Mean
1.50
1.79
2.54
2.46
3.58
3.96
2.71
3.71
2.71
2.25
3.44
3.63
3.29
2.17
2.54
2.06
2.40
2.02
2.63
4.06
1.75
2.48
3.56
2.25
2.15
2.40
2.73
2.17
3.23
2.04
2.29
2.56
2.38
3.38
1.94

Std.
Deviation
0.619
0.824
0.874
0.824
0.895
0.988
1.031
0.944
0.967
0.838
0.848
0.959
1.129
0.953
1.051
0.932
1.005
0.934
0.959
0.727
0.700
1.010
0.943
0.978
0.714
0.736
1.067
0.559
1.036
0.99
0.94
0.85
0.96
0.96
0.73
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Demographics and Descriptive Statistics
After pretesting, large scale surveying was conducted. Participants included
operators from all airframes and locations across AMC; however, there were no
distinguishing measures to determine gender, age, or race. The data response used 332
samples (302 minimum) of which 88% were Active Duty, 3.3% National Guard, and
7.8% Reserve. Six responses did not specify their military status. Table 5shows the
represented airframes, while Table 6 shows the represented locations. In Table 5, the
Active Duty unclassified percentages were provided by OpsRAMS, and does not include
the Reserve/Guard C-17/C-5/C-130H percentages. The participant percentage is close to
the actual percentage of Active Duty distributions but does not accurately account for
Guard / Reserves. The information regarding percentage of pilots allocated to each base
location is considered classified and unable to be reported in this dissertation. However,
rates were highest among the largest bases of McChord, Travis, Charleston, and
Fairchild, each of the four largest AMC bases. It is unknown if each base was equally
represented.
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Table 5
AMC MWS Representation

Airframe
No response
C-130H
C-130J
C-17
C-37
C-21
C-5
KC-10
KC-135

Frequency
6
6
56
117
2
9
12
34
90

Current AD
Participation Percentage
Percent
(unclassified)
1.8
1.8
0
16.9
18
35.2
32
.6
1
2.7
1
3.6
7
10.2
14
27.1
27
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Table 6
AMC Base Location
Base location
No Response
Andrews
Birmingham
Charleston
Dobbins
Dover
Dyess
Elmendorf
Fairchild
Ft. Bragg
Grissom
Hickam
Kadena
Little Rock
MacDill
March
McChord
McConnell
McGuire
Memphis
Niagra
Ohio Grd
Pease
Ramstein
Salt Lake City
Scott
Seymour Johnson
Stewart
Travis
Wright Patterson
Yokota

Frequency
11
4
1
29
1
23
23
2
26
2
1
9
13
27
5
2
34
30
29
2
1
1
1
2
5
9
2
2
31
2
2

Percent
3.3
1.2
0.3
8.7
0.3
6.9
6.9
0.6
7.8
0.6
0.3
2.7
3.9
8.1
1.5
0.6
10.2
9.0
8.7
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.6
1.5
2.7
0.6
0.6
9.3
0.6
0.6
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The highest response rates were from C-17s (35.2%) and McChord AFB (10.2%). There
were 30 missing values in the entire data set of 362 responses; the 30 surveys with
missing data were removed from the study. A non-response bias test was not conducted
due to high response rates.
Descriptive Statistics
The model contained five factors which ultimately measured hypothesized
relationships. Creative programming was necessary for the software to correctly analyze
questions which needed to be inverted in nature. Many of the questions were asked in the
negative but needed positive correlation for the model hypothesis and were reversed
scored for programming use. Throughout the report, those questions that were reversed
scored have an “n” proceeding the question number (i.e.: 6n). Table 6 provides the
frequency, minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of each question.
The individual histograms for each factor provided insight prior to SEM analysis.
Most of the responses were normal with a correct skewness; however, a few showed
abnormal results and were immediately considered for removal. Questions 5, 11, and 23
showed a poor normal distribution curve, and question 29 was bi-modal. All four
questions were immediately removed.
With regard to inconvenience, question 5 was removed from the model because of
poor distribution. With regard to repercussion, 81% percent of the operators did not feel
they would be punished for their ASAP reports; 51% of the response indicated they felt
their identity was truly protected. Forty-eight percent of the responses indicated they
could actually trust their commanders if reports were made. Seventy-four percent
indicated they had trust in the higher headquarters to positively protect identities; fifty-
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four percent of the responses indicated operators felt ASAP would not be used negatively
against them. Thirty percent indicated they were comfortable providing a name with
their report.
With regard to significance of event, 24% indicated they would report a small
event, while 85% indicated they would report a large event. With regard to program
value, 91% of the operators positively felt ASAP currently has value, and 67% believe
policies have been changed because of responses. Eighty-four percent of the operators
felt it was worth their time to use ASAP, and 70% felt the reports have actually been used
to change procedures. Sixty-five percent of the operators felt ASAP reports that were
communicated changed the way they performed their job. Overall, 84% felt ASAP was
good for improving safety.
Measurement Model Assessment
The measurement model, using confirmatory factor analysis, involved data
screening, model evaluation/adjustment, and respecification. The model was run as seen
in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Measurement model.
Normality was examined immediately after the CFA was run. Upon examination of the
kurtosis values for normality, only one of the questions indicated higher than a value of 3:
question #18 (4.321). Byrne (2010) argues a kurtosis level of less than 5 is still
acceptable; however, question 18 raises doubts about acceptability. The question was
ultimately not deleted, due to still being acceptable (less than 5).
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After checking for normality, outliers were examined. Looking for outliers, using
the Mahalanobis d-squared output, Byrne (2010) does not suggest removing outliers from
the data, but rather simply understanding what may affect the output. In the output
section, there were no Mahalanobis d-squared values greater than 100, indicating no need
to examine data for outliers.
Ensuring the data fit the model, there were multiple fit indexes provided by
AMOS. Due to an initial poor model fit indicating inconclusive results, a post-hoc
analysis was required after modifying the model. The model specification was performed
by looking at modification indexes (MI) and adding covariance in the AMOS model
between suggested errors based on large error terms. Once the error terms were covaried,
the model improved and achieved good model fit. Table 7 shows the initial and modified
fit statistics, which indicates the initial measurement model was not within tolerances.
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Table 7
Model Fit Indices for Initial and Final Measurement Model

Model Fit
Indices
GFI
AGFI
NFI
CFI
CFMIN/df
RMSEA

Acceptance
Value
> 0.90
> 0.90
> 0.90
> 0.95
< 3.00
< 0.06

Initial
Measurement
Model
0.836
0.785
0.736
0.781
4.295
0.196

Adjusted
Measurement
Model
0.933
0.902
0.901
0.953
1.797
0.049

The Chi-square value associated with the model is significant, X2 = 63.220 (df =38, p =
.006). By covarying based on the modified indices, the adjusted CFA model shows
satisfactory index limits as indicated in Table 6 and thus good model fit. Throughout the
process of gaining an acceptable model, it was continuously modified 16 times, due to
construct validity testing.
Validity Testing
Convergent validity, the extent to which measures of the same construct are
correlated, can be used by looking at both factor loadings or testing for AVE. In this
case, factor loadings greater than .7 are good, with greater than .5 being acceptable (Hair
et al, 2010). Three separate responses were questionably low: numbers 13, 19n, and 26.
After calculating AVE, the PV and R constructs were slightly low (<.5), and the ORSC
construct was significantly low (.228), indicating poor validity. It is therefore concluded
there is not significant evidence to suggest acceptable convergent validity, and changes
were needed to be made by examining the previously mentioned questions. By removing
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one scale item at a time and re-running the CFA model, convergent validity could be reevaluated.
Changes were made by considering the removal of scale items and re-evaluating
for normality, outliers, model fit, and once again testing for validity. ORSC was
significantly low to start, indicating less than a value of .5. Question 13 was removed,
and the entire process was re-evaluated. As the removal of questions continued,
normality and outliers were not a factor, as they tested acceptable each time. However, a
good model fit required covarying error terms with the new CFA model being run each
time. Eventually, questions 19n and 26 were also separately removed, finally providing
an acceptable convergent validity score for ORSC of 0.531. In doing so, other constructs
also needed examining; perceived value also had initial poor AVE with a score of only
0.3998. Significant removal of questions was required, as seen in the final SEM model to
achieve a valid test. The construct repercussion required the removal of a single item.
The final validity scores can be seen in Table 8 with the AVE scores listed. A value of
greater than .5 is considered acceptable.
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Table 8
AVE Measured Against the 5 Factors

PV
SE
R
I
ORSC

Initial
Model
0.3998
0.5152
0.4364
0.5056
0.2283

AVE
Modified
Model
0.584
0.684
0.531
0.567
0.531

After testing for normality, outliers, a good model fit, and finally convergent
validity, the model was tested for discriminant validity. Discriminant validity (distinctive
validity), the extent to which constructs are distinct, was tested by comparing maximum
shared variance (MSV) with AVE, with a valid test showing all MSV less than the
corresponding AVE values as seen in Table 9.
Table 9
Discriminate Validity Results

R
R
I
R
SE
I
SE
I
PV
I

Squared Correlation
<--> SE
0.177
<--> PV
0.096
<--> R
0.036
<--> ORSC
0.101
<--> PV
0.198
<--> SE
0.078
<--> ORSC
0.511
<--> PV
0.150
<--> ORSC
0.292
<--> ORSC
0.133

AVE
I
R
SE
PV
ORSC

0.567
0.531
0.684
0.584
0.531
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Reliability Testing
Reliability is the ability for a measure to be consistent over time. To test for good
construct reliability or composite reliability (CR), the sum of factor loadings was
calculated for each construct as seen in Table 10.

Table 10
Construct Reliability
Construct
Inconvenience
Repercussion
Significance of Event
Program Value
ORSC

CR
0.819
0.817
0.899
0.881
0.806

An acceptable value for construct reliability is greater than 0.7. After testing for
normality, outliers, model fit and validity, all constructs demonstrated satisfactory
construct reliability (>.7), and thus the measurement model was considered complete.
The primary changes were due to the removal of factors in the reliability testing process.
The final model fit statistics are shown in Table 11 and indicate a good model fit. Figure
8 provides the pictorial final model used for testing. Table 12 shows the factor loadings.
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Table 11
Model Fit Indices for Final Measurement Model
Model Fit
Indices

Acceptance
Value

GFI
AGFI
NFI
CFI
CMIN/df
RMSEA

> 0.90
> 0.90
> 0.90
> 0.95
< 3.00
< 0.06

Adjusted
Measurement
Model
0.933
0.902
0.901
0.953
1.797
0.049

Table 12
Factor Loadings of Measurement Model
4
3
12n
8n
6n
15
17
14
28
25
18
16

<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<---

I
I
R
R
R
SE
SE
SE
PV
PV
ORSC
ORSC

0.543
0.917
0.74
0.801
0.636
0.851
0.892
0.73
0.547
0.933
0.777
0.677

Final
Measurement
Model
0.960
0.937
0.959
0.983
1.664
0.045
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Figure 8. Final Measurement model.

Structural Model Testing (SEM)
With a validated measurement model, the final model was constructed, based on
the hypotheses being tested. Figure 9 shows the final SEM model. The model was tested
for normality, outliers, demonstrated acceptable kurtosis values (<.500), and minimal D2
values.
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Figure 9. Standardized path coefficients for SEM.
Model fit was observed using the same method as the CFA model with the results
shown in Table 13. The model had a good fit with the exception of a slightly high
RMSEA. AMOS suggested covarying the R and PV constructs, and when doing so, the
model demonstrated acceptable fit. When looking at the M.I. values in the AMOS
output, there were no significantly high values to note, suggesting there were no longer
any new relationships to potentially consider.
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Table 13
Model Fit for
Structural Model
Desired Original Modified
CMIN/df <3.0
2.378
2.128
GFI
>0.9
0.948
0.959
AGFI
>0.9
0.904
0.923
NFI
>0.9
0.925
0.943
CFI
>0.95
0.950
0.968
RMSEA <0.060
0.072
0.058

Hypothesis Testing
The hypotheses are restated for convenience.
H1: Perceived repercussion is positively related to operators submitting ASAP reports.
H2: Inconvenience is positively related to operators submitting ASAP reports.
H3: The significance of an event is positively related to operators submitting ASAP
reports.
H4: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to operators
submitting ASAP reports.
H5: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to significance of
event.
H6. The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to inconvenience.
Figure 9 illustrates the standardized path coefficients for the model. The numbers
indicate the standard regression weight each factor has on another, or the amount of
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comparative influence each has. As seen in the figure, Significance of Event (SE) has the
greatest influence on Operator Reports Safety Concern (ORSC) at .53. Program Value
(PV) had a moderate influence of .36. PV also had influences on SE and I of .11 and .52
respectively. Table 14 shows the actual structural model hypothesis testing statistics.
Table 14
Structural Model Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis
H1: Repercussion
 Operator Reports
H2: Inconvenience  Operator Reports
H3: Sig of Event
 Operator Reports
H4: Program Value  Operator Reports
H5: Program Value  Sig of Event
H6: Program Value  Inconvenience
Note. p = significant at 0.05.

Standardized
Estimate
-0.05
0.07
0.53
0.36
0.11
0.52

t-value
-0.966
0.878
9.71
2.481
6.691
3.756

p-value
0.334
0.38
***
0.013
***
***

Result
Not Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

H1 was not supported. Repercussion was not positively related to Operator
Reports Safety Concerns, Standardized Path Coefficient (R, ORSC) = -.05. The data does
not support that the more an operator felt there would be no fear of repercussion, the
more likely the operator was to report a safety concern. The relationship was not
significant at the significance level of 0.05 (p=0.334).
H2 was also not supported. Inconvenience was positively related to Operator
Reports Safety Concerns, Standardized Path Coefficient (I, ORSC) = .07; however, because
the p-value was so high, it is not acceptable to say the more an operator felt the ASAP
process was convenient to use, the more likely the operator was to report a safety
concern. This relationship was not significant at the significance level of 0.05 (p=0.38).
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H3 was supported. Significance of Event was positively related to Operator
Reports Safety Concerns, Standardized Path Coefficient (SE,ORSC) = .53, indicating the
more an operator felt the event was of significant nature, the more likely the operator was
to report the safety concern. The relationship was statistically significant at the
significance level of 0.05 (p<0.001).
H4 hypothesized a positive relationship between Program Value and Operator
Reports Safety Concerns, and this hypothesis was also supported, Standardized Path
Coefficient (PV,ORSC) = .36, indicating that program value is an appropriate indicator to
predict if operators will report safety concerns. The relationship was statistically
significant at the significance level of 0.05 (p<0.013).
H5 was supported. Program Value was positively related to Significance of
Event, Standardized Path Coefficient (PV,SE) = .11, indicating that individuals who thought
there was value in the program were more likely to report events of all significance. The
relationship was statistically significant at the significance level of .005 (p < .001).
H6 was supported. Program Value was positively related to Inconvenience,
Standardized Path Coefficient (PV,I) = .52, indicating that individuals who thought there
was value in the program were more likely to report events regardless of how
inconvenient the process was. The relationship was statistically significant at the
significance level of .005 (p < .001).
Alternate Theory
The structural model had a good fit with the exception of a slightly high RMSEA.
Within the results, IBM SPSS AMOS 25 suggested covarying the R and PV constructs.
When covarried, the model still demonstrated acceptable fit. Because this study was
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confirmatory in nature and not exploratory, further analysis was not considered for this
dissertation. However, it is important to note that two hypotheses of the structural model
were not supported, while an additional theoretical model was supported. If this was the
case, the potential new alternate theory would look like Figure 10, where repercussion
influences program value.

Figure 10. Alternate theory model.

Summary
This chapter presents the analytical results of the structural model. Three hundred
and sixty-two surveys were returned, with 30 surveys being removed due to incomplete
data. The data were tested for normality and outliers and produced no significant results
requiring attention. The CFA model was run and tested for model fit. With a poor model
fit, multiple covariations were required to satisfy all the required restraints. With each
iteration of the model being adjusted, it was necessary to continuously test for normality
and outliers before testing for a good model fit and evaluating validity and reliability.
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The final structural model (SEM) was tested for model fit and was found to have
exceptional fit after a simple covariance suggested by AMOS. The results indicate four
of the six hypotheses are supported. The next chapter draws conclusions and suggests
potential research considerations for the future.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Today, safety reporting is a prime example of preventative safety and how
organizations can gather safety information to help prevent an accident before the mishap
occurs (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford, 2008). As aircraft became more expensive and
aircrew become more valuable, it is necessary to transition to a new philosophy of safety
culture—one which seeks to prevent accidents through proactive measures (Brady, 2000).
The presented research investigated the relationships among different factors which
influenced whether an operator chose to report a safety concern. The desired subjects of
study were all Air Force operators, but for the purposes of this study, the field of
participants was narrowed to upgrading operators in Air Mobility Command. The
purpose of this study was to determine how much influence four potential factors had on
operators’ intentions to submit ASAP reports—one of three primary proactive safety
programs being used by the Air Force.
Literature suggests there are multiple reasons why individuals choose not to
report safety concerns, including repercussion, convenience, significance of event, and
value (Freiwald, 2013; Griffin & Neal; Mullen, 2004; Pransky, Snyder, Allard, &
Himmelstein, 1999). Six different relationships were proposed as hypotheses, with the
data suggesting positive relationships exist among four of the six hypotheses. The data
did not suggest a positive relationship existed between repercussion and reporting, and
the data did not suggest a statistically positive relationship existed between inconvenience
and reporting.
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Discussion of the Results
Sample Characteristics. Gender and age were not considered important
demographics in this research. Looking at the characteristics of those who participated in
the study, the results indicate the most surveys came from C-17 and subsequently KC135 pilots, with a majority of the responses coming from Travis AFB, Charleston AFB,
and McChord AFB. These responses tie with the fact that a large majority of assets
operated by AMC are indeed C-17s and KC-135s. The sample closely mimics the Active
Duty pilot force; however, the Guard and Reserve components are not accurately
measured. In addition, this survey happened to gather only pilots and did not sample
other mobility aircrew positions. The data is effective in representing AMC Active Duty
Pilots.
Hypothesis Results
Zohar (2010) specifically argued a strong safety climate would lead to a reduction
in accidents. One indication of the prevention of accidents is the safety performance of
an organization (Zohar, 2010)—organizations that have a positive safety climate
experience fewer accidents and injuries than those with a negative safety climate (Allen,
Barren, & Scott, 2010). The intent of this research was to determine why operators
would or would not report safety concerns.
The research was formed from two basic research questions:
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Research Question 1: Which of the four identified factors influence operator’s
intentions on submitting ASAP reports?



Research Question 2: How do the four identified factors affect operator’s
intentions submitting ASAP reports?
The above research questions, along with reviewed literature, led the research to

test six potential relationships written as hypotheses. Three important surveys questions,
which did not pertain necessarily to the model but were considered valuable knowledge
by AMC, included knowledge about the program itself (questions 1, 2, and 29).
Histogram 1 favored very positively that 97.3% of AMC operators are familiar with
ASAP; however, only 81% of the operators were able to positively claim they knew how
to actually report a safety concern. Only 36% were aware about a signed commander’s
policy. This indicates that a majority of the operators have heard of the program and are
aware of safety reporting options. The relatively high reporting procedures indicates
communication about how to report safety concerns was strong, but additional training
can provide stopgaps. The low number of awareness of a commander’s letter could
potentially indicate a communication problem, lack of association, or another factor
which would need to be further researched.
Hypothesis #1 stated: Perceived repercussion is positively related to operators
submitting ASAP reports. With regard to repercussion, operators provided mixed
reviews with trust in the organization. Currently, individuals find themselves in
situations where they feel there are two outcomes to a mistake: report the mistakes and
risk reprimand, or hide the mistake and hope the entire crew remains silent. This
mentality must end; it is imperative for individuals to report safety concerns (Dekker,
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2012). Just culture is an atmosphere where front-line operators are not punished for
actions, omissions, or decisions made commensurate with experience and training, and
where gross negligence, willful disregard, and destructive acts are not tolerated (Oliber,
2015). The model did not indicate repercussion directly influenced whether an operator
reported a safety concern. However, only 36% of operators were aware of a signed
commander’s letter, a letter that outlines the trust in the program and a promise against
retribution by high-level leaders. Eighty-one percent of the operators did not feel they
would be punished for their ASAP reports—a strong sentiment for the program; yet only
51% of the responders indicated they felt their identity was truly protected. There is still
speculation that crewmembers have been disqualified or punished because of previously
reported events, and only 48% of the responses indicated they could actually trust their
commanders if reports were made. A significantly higher response (74%) indicated
positive trust in the higher headquarters to protect identities existed; yet only 54% of the
responses indicated they felt ASAP would not be used negatively against them. Only
30% indicated they were comfortable providing a name with their report. The data, along
with the rejected hypothesis in the model, suggests operators are not discouraged entirely
from reporting due to repercussion; however, they may not trust the system or provide
contact information for follow-up questions or clarification.
Hypotheses #2 stated: Inconvenience is positively related to operators submitting
ASAP reports. With regard to inconvenience, the model indicated inconvenience did not
directly influence whether an operator reported safety concerns or not. Gilbey, Tani, and
Tsui (2015) hypothesized one possible explanation for a lack of safety reporting was the
inconvenience of completing the actual report itself. Specifically, Gilbey et al. (2015)
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discussed the disadvantage of not being able to immediately report a situation due to
other priorities, time for completion of the report, or simple memory loss of the event.
Only 54.2% of the operators responded positively that the process was convenient, while
similar numbers indicated operators felt ASAP took too long to complete the process.
Only 21.7% indicated positively that ASAP was a priority as part of post-mission duties.
However, despite the relatively poor numbers, the model does not suggest that the
program is so inconvenient that it would prevent an operator from reporting a safety
concern.
Hypothesis #3 stated: The significance of an event is positively related to
operators submitting ASAP reports. Significance of event provided drastic results and
indicated the size of the event made a difference in whether a report was made or not. In
a study conducted by Gilbey, Tani, and Tsui, “bad outcomes were judged as more likely
to be reported than identical acts with innocuous outcomes” (2015, p. 141). Gilbey et al.
(2015) suggested if there was no publicity about an event, it could be assumed that the
outcome of the concern was innocuous, and therefore, the concern was probably
groundless. If the individual perceives an event as innocuous, high potential exists for
under-reporting. The model indicated significance of event directly affected if an
operator reported safety concerns. Only 24% indicated they would report a small event,
while 85% indicated they would report a large event. Being at fault did not appear to
have a significant impact on reporting—operators generally chose to report safety
concerns if safety of flight was compromised, regardless of pilot fault. These results
directly indicate operators are not reporting safety concerns if the event is not deemed to
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be a significant event in their mind, regardless of the potential ramifications of future
operations.
Hypothesis #4 stated: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively
related to operators submitting ASAP reports. Program value had mixed responses but
was determined to directly affect if an operator reported safety concerns. Gilbey, Tani,
and Tsui (2015) suggested a lack of priority toward safety could contribute to an underreported safety program. If no incident investigation or corrective actions were expected
from reported accidents, employees could feel it was pointless to bring forward
information (Probst & Estrada, 2010). In the study, ninety-one percent of the operators
positively felt ASAP had value, yet only 67% believe policies have been changed
because of responses. Eighty-four percent of the operators still felt it was worth their
time to use ASAP, and 70% felt the reports had actually been used to change procedures.
Interestingly, only 65% of the operators felt ASAP reports that were communicated
changed the way they performed their job. Overall, 84% felt ASAP was good for
improving safety. The responses indicate operators see value in having the program and
can factor-in whether operators report their concerns or not.
Hypothesis #5 stated: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively
related to significance of event while hypothesis #6 stated: The perceived value of the
ASAP program is positively related to inconvenience. The factor program value was
statistically determined to directly influence whether a safety concern should be reported;
answers from the surveys indicated an overwhelming support for ASAP existed.
According to Gilbey et al. (2015), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
claims the accurate and timely reporting of relevant information related to hazards
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reported by front-line personnel is one of the best sources of data. Essentially, the
hypotheses were positively confirmed that program value positively influences the
factors significance of event and inconvenience. According to the model, significance of
event, and perceived value are factors that directly influence whether an operator reports
safety concerns.
Conclusions
Recent military crashes have highlighted a need for an advanced safety program.
It is not acceptable in the modern Air Force or aviation industry to simply wait for
mishaps to occur in order to find preventable measures. Proactive safety is a real and
necessary commodity which has the ability to prevent mishaps and save lives, and starts
with a positive safety culture.
The Aviation Safety Action Program is one of the most direct, front-line methods
operators and management have available to gather valid safety information. According
to Zohar (2010), meta-analytic data suggests safety climate perceptions predict safety
behaviors. With a positive safety climate, trust permeates the organization, and the
“existence of a healthy safety culture is a necessary attribute of the fully developed SMS”
(Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008, p. 270). However, a significant under-reporting of
safety concerns exists throughout multiple industries (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015). The
effectiveness of a proactive safety program rests with the assumption that a free-flow
information channel exists and is used judiciously to make aware of incidents, accidents,
unsafe behaviors, and simple concerns (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015). It is believed
significant amounts of under-reporting exists in AMC.
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Theoretical Contributions. The results of this study truly indicate operators
appreciate and recognize the importance of a preventative safety program. However,
there are still reporting issues to consider. An operator who does not feel safe in leaving
contact information prevents the ability for safety individuals to ask additional questions
or clarify an event. The model indicated that the factor repercussion did not directly
affect if an operator reported a safety concern. However, it is unknown if the operators
already feel completely safe with reporting, or if the operator would feel comfortable IF
there were no repercussion considerations. While this dissertation failed to prove
perceived repercussion positively contributed to operators reporting safety concerns,
descriptive statistics proved operators are still fearful of management and lack basic trust
in higher officials.
With information from this research, OpsRAMS potentially has the ability to
increase their safety reporting numbers. With additional safety information being
provided directly from operators, it is possible for fewer aviation incidents to occur—
literature indicates a strong safety culture has been demonstrated to help reduce mishaps,
and a strong safety culture is concurrent with the free-flowing information of all aspects
of the operation (Probst, 2008). It is impossible for management to have knowledge on
all aspects of the operations. However, it is theorized that with additional safety reports
concerning small situations, upper-level management will have the tools and capabilities
to implement change as required to mitigate newly discovered hazards.
One of the biggest hurdles for the Air Force to problem-solve will be changing a
culture of operators fearing retribution. A commitment to “safety and establishing a
positive [safety culture] as the starting point toward achieving a sustainable business can
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yield great benefits not only in terms of improved safety performance, but also with
regards to improvements in a firm’s environmental and financial outcomes”
(Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2014, p. 274). In a recent ASAP, a crew member discussed
self-induced throttle binding on a mission but failed to provide contact information. By
not providing the information, it was difficult for safety professionals to understand the
background culture of why the self-induced situation had occurred. Hajmohammad and
Vachon (2014) suggest organizations with a positive [safety culture] are more likely to
gain better financial, environmental, and safety outcomes as a result of their increased
employees’ commitment in pursuing organization goals and objectives.
Practical Implications. The data indicate ASAP can be more slightly
convenient. At the time of this writing, but after the surveys were completed, Air Force
safety officials had already recognized a convenience problem existed and began to
implement smart-phone and tablet applications to combat against the inconvenience of
the process. However, it is inaccurate to claim that a more utilized and convenient ASAP
system prevented a specific amount of aircraft mishaps. For example: as OpsRAMS
makes ASAP even more convenient to use, it is unknown if the convenience factor will
be the reason for increased reports. Second, a safety institution cannot claim a specific
set of mishaps were prevented in the future because of a written safety report. When
MFOQA discovered a hazard at Moses Lake with C-17s turning early, the procedures
were adjusted to prevent a potential mishap. However, there is nothing to say a mishap
ever would have occurred if the procedures had not been changed in the first place.
The same theory should be recognized by OpsRAMS with the knowledge of this
research. If changes are made to produce more safety reports, OpsRAMS will have
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increased knowledge to act upon specific safety concerns as required. However, the
increased reports cannot specifically be accredited to an aviation mishap that could or
could not have happened in the future.
Limitations. It was concluded that the majority of the Air Force’s focus should
include promoting the value of the safety system, while educating the need to report all
magnitude of events. Probst (2008) confirmed two hypotheses during research: that
organizational safety climate is related to the rate of experienced employee injuries, such
that a more positive climate is related to a lower injury rate; and that organizations with a
poor safety climate underreport injuries to a greater extent than organizations with a
positive safety climate. It is assumed that not all safety concerns will be reported, and not
all members of the organization will embrace and trust the organization. It will be nearly
impossible to truly convince every member that punitive actions will not be taken for
self-reported safety concerns. Probst (2008) discovered in research that the existence of
underreporting itself was not a new finding, but that a poor safety climate might be linked
to underreporting. However, with even slightly more safety reports and slight increases
in trust, the organization can slowly shift toward a true just culture and a considerably
safer operation, demonstrating a positive climb in safety culture.
It is difficult to rate exactly what is considered significant or insignificant. The
research suggests one of the most influential factors of this research is the significance of
an event. However, this research never specified what is to be considered a major event
or not, and simply left it to the participants to decide. While it is relatively easy to
assume what is considered a major event and a very minor event, the line separating the
two distinctions was never defined, and could have impacted the outcome of the study.
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It should be noted that the sample surveyed included mostly Active Duty mobility
pilots. The data unfortunately cannot accurately speak to the opinions or thoughts of the
Guard or Reserves due to lack of sufficient data points. Last, the study only considered
four major factors. It could be argued that other factors play a significant role in
determining reasons for report submissions, or influence the factors mentioned in this
dissertation. This dissertation considered a hypothetical model suggested by the
researcher and was based on literature review and conversations with OpsRAMS. Other
factors were not considered in that model and could have played a role in determining
reporting safety concerns. In addition, with the suggestion of a potentially new model by
AMOS, other factors could potentially affect the model in other ways previously
unaccounted for.
Recommendations
It is important for AMC to attack two primary problems with ASAP in the
mindset of the operator: program value and significance of event. The data suggested
operators loosely believed in the safety system (program value)—the hypothesis was
supported that operators who had a positive belief in the program were more likely to
report concerns; however, the data also indicated a majority of the sample did not believe
in the program itself.
OpsRAMS already worked to make the program more convenient to use after
previous surveys were conducted, and the data suggested that inconvenience was not a
major factor in reporting concerns. There are no recommendations for this factor.
A strong safety climate leads to an increase in safety performance (Zohar, 2010).
The model did not specifically prove repercussion directly influences safety concerns,
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but further research may link repercussion with program value. However, looking at
many of the individual questions, underlying trust issues still exist in the organization. It
is unknown at this time exactly why AMC operators do not trust the safety program.
Trust issues could reside within the program, a management section, or the entire
organization. The FAA allowed for the ability for civil airmen to receive immunity (with
discretion) for reporting safety concerns—the military offered no such allowance.
Discovering why AMC operators do not trust the program will significantly help toward
acceptance and use of the process and hopefully produce more safety reports and is an
excellent topic for future research. On the surface, it would appear there is simply not
enough trust in the commanders or reporting process when operators commit mistakes.
However, research also indicates if safety-of-flight was at risk, operators would still
report the concern. It is recommended for AMC to reinforce safety culture to both the
commanders and operators. If a commander punishes, not in accordance with the Major
Command’s intent, the entire system is in jeopardy of being undermined.
It is also important to emphasize the need to report all magnitudes of safety
events. The data suggests operators will report events when they believe the situation is
significant and will not report if they feel the event is insignificant. Many safety issues
can actually be rather insignificant in nature but become a leading cause of catastrophic
failure. Emphasizing the need to report all levels of safety concern will likely increase
the amount of safety reports being generated.
Future Research
This research was limited in scope due to governmental red tape. It is proposed to
conduct a similar study across the entire AMC command, if not the entire Air Force, by
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using this research as a platform for helping the U.S. Air Force understand the need for
such research. In doing so, consideration should be taken for a new proposed model that
links the four factors differently than what was conducted with this research. The U.S.
Safety Center has recently re-named ASAP (Dec 2018) as the Airmen Safety Action
Program, not simply an aviation entity. In doing so, the Air Force is attempting to
implement proactive safety across the entire organization. The benefits to opening
preventative safety to the entire command allow for multi-facet problems to be fixed
prior to an incident. With the ASAP reporting capabilities lying in the hands of all
airmen, small safety concerns can be accounted-for prior to significant mishaps. Future
research is needed to examine if the changes currently being made to the program are
affecting operators’ willingness to report concerns. It is necessary to target the entire
population, (recommended) using a web-based medium, to capture more significant data
to best utilize and advertise the program.
In addition, research regarding ASAP reports correcting safety concerns should be
studied. At the current time, no research indicates if providing feedback to the operators
of their safety concerns has any merit to believe in the program or willingness to repeat
the process. OpsRAMS needs to acknowledge safety concerns. Underreporting can be
accredited to lack of acknowledgement—an employee may be hesitant to provide new
information if a previous report was submitted without any feedback (Frazer, 2013). The
ASAP scoreboard currently tracks all ASAP submissions with results and
recommendations on the website (https://afsas.safety.af.mil). However, direct
communication is often not established. This situation leads individuals to believe
management does not care about safety. Other times, employees may simply believe the
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program is ineffective due to scale, managerial concerns, budget, or other constraints
(Frazer, 2013), thus the program having no value.
As of publication, there is currently no military data to suggest that if an
individual submits a report, but either never hears back about the concern or that the
concern is not ratified, whether the same individual continues to use the system.
Research, specifically targeting ASAP feedback, can improve management’s perspective
about how people are using the program and what differences management needs to take
to ensure people continue to report safety concerns.
Last, this study uncovered the fact that many operators simply do not trust the
program. Employees may perceive reporting their own errors as risky, which may
increase their reluctance to report (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). It is unknown at this time
exactly where the distrust lies, as the research indicates many levels of distrust lie within
multiple levels of management, headquarters, Safety, etc. A future research topic
specifically targeting repercussion against self-incrimination could uncover significant
amounts of data.
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APPENDIX A
ASAP Survey
Under-reporting in the Military Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)
The purpose of this survey is to measure the factors that affect an operators’ intentions to
use the Military Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). This survey should take less
than 3 minutes. There are no right or wrong answers; however, we ask that you
participate and respond in an honest and conscientious way. Your responses are
completely anonymous and you will not be connected to your responses in any manner.
What is your current status? (Circle One):

AD

Guard

Reserve

What is your current MWS? _____________________________________________
What is your current base location? _______________________________________
Please circle your answer.
1.

I am familiar with ASAP.

Strongly Agree

2.

Strongly disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Submitting an ASAP report does not take much of my time.

Strongly Agree

5.

Disagree

ASAP is convenient to use.

Strongly Agree

4.

Neither agree or disagree

I know how to submit an ASAP report.

Strongly Agree

3.

Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

After a sortie, ASAP is a priorty as part of post-mission duties.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree
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6.

I can be Q3’d based solely on an ASAP report.

Strongly Agree

7.

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

I believe crewmembers have been Q3’d based on their ASAP reports.

Strongly Agree

9.

Neither agree or disagree

ASAP reports are truly identity protected.

Strongly Agree

8.

Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Commanders can be trusted if I self-report.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

10. Those who process / analyze ASAP reports can be trusted to protect my
identity.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

11. ASAP information can be used negatively against me.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

12. I fear ASAP information will be used to punish my unintentional errors.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

13. I am likely to submit an ASAP report for a small deviation.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

14. I am likely to submit an ASAP report for a major deviation.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

15. I am likely to submit an ASAP if I was clearly wrong.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

16. I am likely to submit an ASAP if safety of flight was compromised, but I was not
at fault.
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

17. I am likely to submit an ASAP if safety of flight was compromised, and I AM at
fault.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

18. I am likely to submit a report if I feel the event was significant.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

19. I would NOT submit a report if I feel the event was minor.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

20. I can escape punishment / a potential Q3 if I submit an ASAP.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

21. I see value in the ASAP program.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

22. I believe policies have been changed because of ASAP reports.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

23. I am likely to include my name/contact info for follow-up questions in an ASAP
report.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

24. ASAP is a great way to communicate safety concerns with senior-leadership.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

25. It is worth my time to submit an ASAP report.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

26. Information gatherd by ASAP is actually used to change procedures / policies.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree
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27. Communicated ASAP reports change how I perform my job.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

28. ASAP is generally effective in improving safety.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

29. I am aware of the AMC/CC signed ASAP policy letter.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree
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APPENDIX B
Agreement to Participate
Survey of ASAP IN THE USAF: MOBILITY AIRCREWS’ INTENTIONS TO USE
SAFETY REPORTING
STUDY LEADERSHIP. I am asking you to take part in a research project that is led by
Travis Whittemore, graduate student, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
PURPOSE. The purpose of this study is to ascertain the value certain factors have on
AMC aircrews’ intentions to provide ASAP reports.
ELIGIBILITY. To be in this study, you must be 18 years or older and a resident of the
United States.
PARTICIPATION. During this study, you will be asked to complete a brief survey using
pen and paper regarding your perceptions about AMC safety reports. The completion of
the survey will take approximately 5 minutes.
RISKS OF PARTICIPATION. The risk of participating in the study are minimal, no
more than everyday life.
BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION. Your answers will be compiled and analyzed for
senior leadership. Your participation may influence changes in policy and safety
promotion.
COMPENSATION. There is no compensation offered for taking part in this study.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION. Your participation in this study is completely
voluntary. You may stop or withdraw from the study at any time or refuse to answer any
particular question without it be held against you. If you choose to ‘opt-out’ during the
research process, no data collected will be used in the study. Your decision whether or
not to participate will have no effect on your current or future connection with anyone at
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University or the United States Air Force.
RESPONDENT PRIVACY. Your individual information will be protected in all data
resulting from this study. Your responses to this survey will be anonymous. No personal
information will be collected other than basic demographic descriptors. No one other than
the researcher and survey administrator will have access to any of the responses.
FURTHER INFORMATION. If you have any questions or would like additional
information about this study, please contact Travis Whittemore, whittemt@erau.eud or
the faculty member overseeing this project, Dr. Mark Friend, frien9b8@erau.edu.
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The ERAU Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved this project. You may contact
the ERAU IRB with any questions or issues at 386-226-7179 or teri.gabriel@erau.edu.
ERAU’s IRB is registered with the Department of Health & Human Services – Number –
IORG0004370.
CONSENT. By participating in this survey, you certify that: you are 18 years or older, a
resident of the U.S., understand the information on this form, that someone has answered
any and all questions you may have about this study, and you voluntarily agree to
participate in the study.
If you do not wish to participate in the study, simply do not fill out the survey.
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APPENDIX C
Steckel ASAP Survey
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APPENDIX D
ERAU IRB Approval Exempt Determination

127

128
APPENDIX E
SME Biographies
COLONEL TIMOTHY G. GROSZ (Retired)
Tim Grosz is the Chief, Operations Risk Assessment and Management System (Ops RAMS) Branch. It
establishes processes to collect multi-source data and identify trends in order to mitigate risk in all mobility
activities and make cross-functional adjustments to policy and training. It uses trend data from various
sources including, but not limited to, Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA), Aviation
Safety Action Program (ASAP), Standardization and Evaluation flight evaluation data, simulator
performance data, Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Visits (ASEVs), Staff Assistance Visits
(SAVs), Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) reports, Air Traffic System Evaluation Program (ATSEP)
reports, aircrew surveys, Aviation Operational Risk Management (AvORM), Safety investigations and
analysis, and other forums providing information and trends concerning Mobility Air Forces (MAF)
operations.
Colonel Grosz is a graduate of Northbrook Sr. High School, Houston, TX. He earned a Bachelor of
Science degree in Operations Research in 1981 from the U.S. Air Force Academy and a Master of Arts
degree in Aerospace/Aviation Management in 1993 from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
Colonel Grosz was commissioned as a second lieutenant in May 1981 and is a command pilot with over
4000 hours in the T-38, C-141B and C-5. He retired from the Air Force 1 June 2011.
EDUCATION
1981 Bachelor of Science Degree in Operations Research, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colo.
1986 Squadron Officer School (correspondence)
1986 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
1992 Air Command and Staff College (correspondence)
1993 Master of Arts Degree, Aerospace/Aviation Management, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
1997 Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
ASSIGNMENTS
1.
July 1981 – June 1982, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Laughlin Air Force Base, Tex.
2.
November 1982 – March 1985, Instructor Pilot, Laughlin Air Force Base, Tex.
3.
April 1985 – May 1987, Detachment Operations Officer, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.
4.
May 1987 – July 1988, Detachment Commander, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.
5.
July 1988 – July 1990, Aide-De-Camp ATC Commander, Randolph Air Force Base, Tex.
6.
September 1990 – April 1993, Chief Pilot C-141B, Instructor Pilot, McChord Air Force Base, Wash.
7.
April 1993 – September 1994, Aide-De-Camp USAFE/AIRCENT Commander, Ramstein Air Base,
Germany
8.
September 1994 – June 1996, Chief Plans & Military Cooperation, HQ AFELM NATO/AIRCENT,
Ramstein Air Base, Germany
9.
July 1996 – June 1997, Student Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
10.
September 1997 – July 1998, Commander 62d Operations Support Squadron, McChord Air Force Base,
Wash.
11.
July 1998 – April 2000, Commander 8th Airlift Squadron, McChord Air Force Base, Wash.
12.
May 2000 – June 2002, Military Assistant to the Executive Secretary of Department of Defense, Pentagon
13.
July 2002 - June 2003, Deputy Commander, 721st Air Mobility Operations Group, Ramstein Air Base,
Germany
14.
June 2003 - April 2005, Commander, 721st Air Mobility Operations Group, Ramstein Air Base, Germany
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15.
16.
17.

April 2005 – December 2006, Commander, 615th Contingency Response Wing, Travis Air Force Base,
Calif.
December 2006 – May 2011, Assistant Director, Air, Space, and Information Operations, Headquarters Air
Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.
July 2012 – Present, Chief, Operations Risk Assessment and Management System, Headquarters Air
Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating:
Command Pilot
Flight Hours:
More than 4000
Aircraft
T-38, C-141B, C-5
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal

LT COLONEL JAMES R. BROWNING
Lt Col James R. Browning is the Chief of Safety for the 47th Flying Training Wing, Laughlin AFB, Texas.
He is the principle safety advisor to the Wing Commander and is responsible for directing and
implementing the Wing-level flight, explosives and occupational safety programs. Lt Col Browning also
leads base mishap prevention, Bird Aircraft Strike Hazard reductions, annual/spot safety inspection
programs and all formal safety investigation reports ensuring the safety of 5,400 total base community
personnel and spanning over $1.4 billion in base property assets and $1.1 billion in aircraft assets.
Lt Col Browning was commissioned through the Air Force Officer Training School at Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama in 2001 and earned his pilot wings at Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi in 2003. As an airlift
aviator he has held various positions at the squadron, group and wing levels operating the C-5 and C-40
in missions all over the globe including support for operations ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI
FREEDOM, NEW DAWN and ODYSSEY DAWN.
In his previous assignment Lt Col Browning was Chief, Standardization and Evaluation for the 436th
Operations Group, Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.
EDUCATION
1999 Bachelor of Science, Electrical Engineering Technology, Texas A&M University, College Station
2006 Master of Business and Administration, Touro University International, Cypress, Cal.
2006 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2010 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
2016 Air War College, by correspondence
ASSIGNMENTS
1. July 2001 – February 2003, Student, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Columbus AFB, Miss.
2. March 2003 – May 2003, Student, C-5 Co-Pilot Initial Qualification Training, Altus AFB, Okla.
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3. June 2003 – April 2005, C-5A/B Pilot; Stan/Eval Liaison, 9 AS, Dover AFB, Del.
4. May 2005 – September 2006, C-5A/B Aircraft Commander; Chief of Awards and Decorations;
Mission Scheduler, 9 AS, Dover AFB, Del.
5. October 2006 – June 2007, C-5A/B Instructor Aircraft Commander; Chief, Squadron Executive Officer,
9 AS, Dover AFB, Del.
6. July 2007 – February 2009, C-40C Aircraft Commander; Chief, Training; Squadron Executive Officer,
54 AS, Scott AFB, Ill.
7. March 2009 – July 2009, C-40C Instructor Aircraft Commander; Assistant Director of
Operations; Operations Flight Commander, 54 AS, Scott AFB, Ill.
8. August 2009 – July 2010, Chief of Wing Flying Safety, 375 AMW, Scott AFB, Ill.
9. August 2010 – February 2011, C-5M Aircraft Commander; Training Officer 9 AS, Dover AFB, Del.
10. March 2011 – August 2011, C-5M Evaluator Aircraft Commander; Chief Squadron Stan/Eval, 9 AS,
Dover AFB, Del.
11. September 2011 – September 2013, C-5M Evaluator Aircraft Commander; Chief, Operations Group
Stan/Eval, 436th Operation Group, Dover AFB, Del.
12. October 2013 – February 2014, Student, T-6A Pilot Instructor Training, Randolph AFB, Texas
13. March 2014 – July 2015, T-6 Instructor Pilot; Assistant Director of Operations, 47 OSS, Laughlin
AFB, Texas
14. August 2015 – February 2016, Director of Staff, 47 OG, Laughlin AFB, Texas
15. March 2016 – March 2017, Director of Operations, 47 OSS, Laughlin AFB, Texas
16. April 2017 – Present, Chief of Safety and T-6 IP, 47 FTW, Laughlin AFB, Texas
FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating:
Senior Pilot
Flight Hours: 4,600 including more than 1,100 combat hours
Aircraft
C-5A/B/M, C-40C, T-37, T-1 and T-6
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster

LT COLONEL LUKE J. SCHNEIDER
Lieutenant Colonel Schneider was commissioned an officer in the US Air Force in May 2000 as a
graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. He completed Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training
in 2001 at Vance Air Force Base as a Distinguished Graduate and AETC Commander’s Trophy recipient.
Following pilot training, Lieutenant Colonel Schneider was assigned to the 494th Fighter Squadron, RAF
Lakenheath, UK where he served as the assistant Chief of Scheduling and F-15E Flight Lead supporting
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2006, he was assigned to the 25th Flying
Training Squadron at Vance AFB, OK where he served as a Flight Commander and T-38C
Instructor/Evaluator pilot. In 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Schneider was assigned to Seymour Johnson AFB,
NC where he upgraded to F-15E Instructor Pilot while serving in the 4th Operational Support Squadron as
the Aircrew Flight Equipment Flight Commander then as an Assistant Director of Operations in the 336th
Fighter Squadron. While there, he deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iron Falcon.
Lieutenant Colonel Schneider attended Air Command and Staff College in 2012, and upon graduation was
assigned to Headquarters Air Force, A10 where he served as the Action Group Chief for Strategic
Deterrence, Nuclear Integration directorate. In 2015, Lieutenant Colonel Schneider was assigned to RAF
Lakenheath, UK where he was an F-15E Flight Lead and served as the Chief of Wing Plans.
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Lieutenant Colonel Schneider holds a Bachelor of Science in Behavioral Science Engineering
from the United States Air Force Academy. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air
Command and Staff College. He holds a Master of Science Degree in Aeronautical Science from EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science.
Lieutenant Colonel Schneider is a Command Pilot with over 2,800 hours of flight time primarily
in the F-15E and T-38C.

